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 This dissertation examines the relationships that develop between social groups and 
political issues and how these connections affect the credibility of groups who speak about these 
topics. In this research program, I create an original psychological construct called issue 
authority, which shapes the ability of groups who try to speak about politics. Issue authority is 
comprised of two dimensions, the Associative Dimension and the Competence Dimension.  I 
argue that groups with issue authority are able to speak convincingly on an issue to a majority of 
the public, not simply to members of their own group. This construct contributes to our 
understanding of group stereotypes because I find that groups with authority can speak 
powerfully and produce persuasive messages regardless of their general societal reputation. 
 In the first study, I explore the first dimension of issue authority, as I analyze how 
individual factors like group identity influence the associations people form between groups and 
political issues in the context of immigration and gun control. In the second study, I examine the 
Competence Dimension by evaluating the groups a majority of the public perceives as the most 
qualified to discuss the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control. Finally, in the third 
study, I employ the results from the second study to investigate whether or not issue authority 
produces expert source cues in these three issue domains.  The findings point to the importance 
of context, as groups the public deems qualified to speak about these issues can speak 
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 “Gay Issues Enter the World of Philanthropy,” “What Would It Take to Replace the Pay 
Working-Class Americans Have Lost?,” “Job Growth Isn’t Just a Women’s Issue,” “Asian-
Americans Face Battle over Affirmative Action,” “Disability and the Right to Choose,” “Older 
Women and Medical Marijuana: A New Growth Industry,” “Latino Groups Warn Congress to 
Fix Immigration, Or Else,” and “Obama, Pushing Criminal Justice Reform, Defends ‘Blacks 
Lives Matter” (The New York Times). 
 These New York Times headlines confirm that ties to social groups are a common 
occurrence in American politics. From political campaigns to political news coverage, we 
observe that social groups are often linked to specific sides on policy issues by political leaders, 
the media, and everyday citizens. Indeed, identifying a political issue that is not associated in 
some way with a social group would be a difficult task. Sometimes, these associations may 
invoke implicit connections to social groups, while the headlines also identify that explicit ties 
between groups and issues exist. For example, Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign 
largely centered around “women’s issues” like equal pay, access to contraception, and education 
(Bischoff, 2015). Though ties between social groups and political issues are pervasive 
throughout the political environment, political scientists have not explored the origins and the 
effects of these connections. 
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 In this dissertation, I explore the links that develop between social groups and political 
issues and how these connections influence the credibility of groups who speak about these 
concerns. I create an original psychological construct called issue authority, and I argue that 
groups with authority are able to speak convincingly on an issue. Using original survey data, I 
first examine the factors that influence these associations between groups and issues to develop. 
Then, I evaluate the groups that have authority on political issues and whether or not this issue 
authority produces expert source cues. Ultimately, the concept of issue authority broadens our 
understanding of social group stereotypes because I find that groups can speak powerfully and 
deliver persuasive messages on specific issues regardless of their overall reputation in society.  
SOCIAL GROUPS AND POLITICAL ISSUES 
 
 Individuals strive to develop a sense of belonging, so they identify with social groups that 
provide positive self-esteem. Not only do these groups contribute to our self-concept, but they 
also provide lenses through which we perceive incoming information. Social groups help us 
process our surroundings, including the political environment (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). After 
individuals acknowledge and internalize their membership, the identity with the group does not 
merely function as an “aspect” of their self-concept, but as an “extension” of their self-concept 
(Brewer, 1991). Thus, individuals evaluate the environment in terms of group perspectives and 
group interests, rather than individual attitudes and interests (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Brewer, 
1991). When group identities are salient, we think on behalf of our social groups, so we should 
naturally form connections between these groups and particular political issues.  
Political scientists have studied the relationship between political parties and various 
issue domains. Issue Ownership Theory suggests that parties not only form connections with 
political problems, but they own those issues that they are associated with or perceived as best 
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able to “handle” (Petrocik, 1996; Walgrave, Levere, and Tresch, 2012). Importantly, this theory 
suggests that members of the public who may not identify as Democrats or Republicans still 
regard one of the two major parties as more qualified to speak about a particular issue. Political 
parties are important social groups in the political environment, and they function as a social 
identity that is chronically salient in a political context (Greene, 1999). However, parties do not 
provide the only group identity that helps people process incoming political information. 
 Other scholars have explored the ties between social groups and political issues in the 
context of political campaigns. They have investigated how the mass public responds to 
candidates across different contexts, noting that some candidates enjoy an advantage in certain 
domains due to general stereotypes associated with their social groups (Shapiro and Mahajan, 
1986; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993). Specifically, scholars have explored the gendered 
component of traits and issues, as voters associate traditional notions of masculinity and 
femininity with “force and violence” issues (e.g. war, crime, etc.) and “compassion issues” (e.g. 
healthcare, welfare, etc.), respectively (Huddy and Terkildson, 1993; Herrnson, Lay, and Stokes, 
2003; Meeks and Domke, 2015). 
 However, I argue that general appraisals of social groups are not the only factors that 
influence how individuals respond to political issues. A group’s relationship to a specific issue 
should also affect public perception of the group’s credibility. For example, women undergo 
abortions, which suggests they may be more knowledgeable on policies related to abortions and 
pre-abortion procedures like sonograms (Conover, 1988). I combine two foundations—our 
current conception of partisan issue ownership and the psychology of social groups—in order to 
construct a new theory of social group issue authority that reveals the consequences of these 
linkages on the public’s perception of these issue domains.   
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OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION 
 
 In the proceeding chapters, three studies investigate how individuals form connections 
between social groups and in turn how these linkages translate into a new psychological 
construct: issue authority. Groups with issue authority are able to speak convincingly on a 
particular issue. These three studies employ different methods and themes, but they ultimately 
combine to provide an outline of the origins of this construct and its effects in three issue areas: 
the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control. Social groups may advocate for policy 
changes in particular issue areas due to their unique experiences with them. Thus, this research 
contributes to our understanding of how the public responds to these connections and whether 
these relationships allow the groups to speak credibly on these issues. 
 In Chapter 2, I explore the first dimension of social group issue authority, the Associative 
Dimension, by demonstrating how individuals make connections between social groups and 
political issues in the context of immigration and gun control. I examine how individual factors 
like social group membership and group identity moderate perceived linkages between groups 
and issues. I argue that individuals will be more likely to associate positively stereotyped groups 
with positively valenced issues and negatively stereotyped groups with negatively valenced 
issues. Additionally, I posit that salient group and partisan identities should inspire variations in 
perceptions of social group associations. Using results from two original public opinion surveys, 
I identify that when selecting from a list of commonly stereotyped social groups, a majority of 
the public associates the poor and men with immigration and gun control, respectively. I also 
demonstrate that variation in perceptions of associations exists because Democrats and 
Republicans associate different groups with the same issues. Additionally, I find that salient 
group identities inspire differences in perceptions of association.  
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 In Chapter 3, I examine the second dimension of issue authority, the Competence 
Dimension, which directly translates into issue authority. I distinguish between stereotypical and 
experiential competence in order to broaden our understanding of why some groups may suffer 
from overall negative stereotypes yet still be able to convince the public they are qualified to 
speak about certain political issues. I evaluate the groups a majority of the public perceives as 
most qualified to discuss the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control. In this analysis, 
I present respondents with a list of commonly stereotyped groups along with a list of issue-
specific groups for these three areas. Based on the results of a nationally representative public 
opinion survey, I conclude that a majority of the public regards victims of sexual harassment, 
Latinos, and victims of gun violence as the most qualified social groups to discuss the #MeToo 
Movement, immigration, and gun control, respectively. However, salient group and partisan 
identities still moderate perceptions of authority. Finally, I find that respondents with higher 
education levels perceive groups higher in experiential competence as more qualified to speak 
about these three issues than groups who only score high on stereotypical competence. The 
results from this chapter demonstrate that people may perceive a group as “cold” or 
“incompetent,” yet these general stereotypes do not preclude a group from speaking 
convincingly on an issue. 
 In Chapter 4, I implement the results from Chapter 3 to analyze the whether or not issue 
authority produces expert source cues in the context of the same three issue areas, the #MeToo 
Movement, immigration, and gun control. I conduct an original survey experiment that compares 
political messages presented by issue authorities with those same messages presented by social 
groups with less issue authority. The initial comparisons between these groups indicate that the 
public perceives issue authorities as more credible sources of information on these issue areas. 
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However, multivariate analysis indicates that individual-level factors influence perceived 
credibility along with the experimental condition. Party identity prevents issue authorities from 
delivering expert source cues in the context of immigration. Once again, these results explain the 
importance of context, and they point to the limits of expertise, which contributes to our 





























A mass shooting occurred at Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School in February 2018. 
After 17 of their peers died, students who survived united and marched in favor of gun control 
(Rozsa, Epstein, and Mettler, 2019). This school shooting along with others have recently inspired 
students to take a stand on the issue, transforming them into a social group that the public thinks 
of in the context of gun policies. 
In the summer of 2018, John Moore’s photograph of a young Honduran girl crying for her 
mother garnered wide-spread attention and placed President Trump’s immigration policy in the 
national spotlight (Selk, 2018). Although the child was not actually one of thousands of immigrant 
children separated from their parents at the U.S. southern border, she still tugged at the heartstrings 
of the public, motivating people to consider how the president’s zero tolerance strategy affected 
children.  
Students and guns, children and immigration—are two examples of the many ways that the 
public links groups in society to political issues and how these connections may influence public 
opinion. But, while political scientists have explored the role of social groups in shaping public 
opinion, they have not evaluated thoroughly the associations between groups and issues and how 
these connections affect awareness of these issues. I argue that perceived issue-group linkages 
influence a group’s issue authority: the ability of members of a group to speak convincingly on an 
issue. I argue that, ultimately, a group’s issue authority is composed of both group affect and a 
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group’s perceived competence in a given issue domain. But, the association between a group and 
an issue is a necessary prerequisite to evaluating which groups are qualified to discuss a particular 
political topic.  
It is difficult to identify an issue in American politics that is not linked to a social group. 
Nonetheless, we know little about the particular groups that people link to many political issues. 
To understand how the public perceives political issues themselves, we must identify which groups 
they associate with them and why. Associating positively stereotyped groups with certain issues 
should reinforce general group stereotypes and contribute to people’s appreciation of those issues. 
Conversely, linking disliked groups to other issues should trigger negative conceptions of those 
issues and reinforce negative views of the groups themselves.  
In this chapter, I explore these ideas by studying the groups the public associates with two 
issues, immigration and gun control. I also examine how individual factors influence these 
perceived connections. In the past, scholars have assumed that specific groups and issues are 
connected, yet I demonstrate that variation in association exists. For this analysis, I draw upon data 
collected from a university sample as well as a student sample.  The results of this study identify 
the groups much of the public connects to immigration and gun control and provide insight into 
how individual characteristics influence differences in perceptions of association.  
A THEORY OF SOCIAL GROUP ISSUE AUTHORITY 
When reacting to a group-related issue, I argue that people are affected by both the group’s 
perceived relationship to the issue and their affect toward the group (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 
2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; Cuddy et al., 1999). When a group has “authority” on an 
issue, it has a special connection to the issue: it is perceived as a qualified source of information 
on the topic. To understand the underpinnings of a group’s issue authority, I posit that relationships 
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between social groups and political issues exist on two dimensions: association and competence 
(Walgrave, Levere, and Tresch, 2012). First, a person forms an association or link between a social 
group and a political issue. For example, many citizens likely associate abortion with women or 
link welfare to the poor. Sometimes, issues are so closely tied with a group that they are often 
referred to by their affiliation with the group (e.g. “women’s” issues, “black” issues, 
“environmentalist” issues, etc.). However, the public likely varies in the groups that they connect 
to specific issues. Second, once a group is associated with an issue, its competence to act as an 
authority on the issue can be evaluated. Therefore, before explaining what determines a group’s 
competence to speak as an authority on an issue, a closer examination of association, a necessary 
condition for competence, is essential.  
THE ORIGIN OF ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN GROUPS AND ISSUES 
The psychological process of recognizing a relationship between a specific group and 
political issue logically occurs prior to evaluations of the group’s competence on the issue 
(Petrocik, 1996). Thus, we must develop an understanding of the factors that influence an 
individual’s propensity to connect a social group to a political issue. When forming attitudes about 
a problem, people may have a certain group in mind when assessing its different aspects. The 
groups individuals link to an issue fundamentally influence their perceptions of the issue itself.  
Social groups play a prominent role in shaping the political agenda in the United States. 
Groups frequently organize around issues that affect them, and they raise awareness of their 
concerns in an effort to influence related public policies (e.g. blacks and policy brutality, women 
and equal pay (Bischoff, 2015; Jones, 2015)) (Goss and Heaney, 2010). Group activity in an issue 
domain should influence the public to form an association between the group and the issue, 
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yet political scientists have not specifically studied how these connections psychologically 
originate.1  
The simple linking of a group and an issue can activate powerful stereotypes of the group 
and powerful images of the issue (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; 
Brambilla, Hewstoe, and Colucci, 2013). Sometimes, these associations can be beneficial for the 
groups involved, as a result of their maintaining positive stereotypes about the group and its 
relationship to the issue. For example, middle class Americans who have worked tirelessly to 
pursue higher education now struggle to pay off student loans, but their connection to this 
particular kind of debt has motivated 2020 presidential candidates to discuss potential remedies to 
this issue (Kim and Thottam, 2019). However, these links can also potentially harm the group if 
the public’s perceived association produces negative feelings about the group and the issue. In the 
height of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, the connection between this disease and gay men 
prevented the general public from acknowledging its severity (Fitzsimons, 2018).  
 General group stereotypes should influence the development of associations between 
groups and issues. People develop stereotypes of groups along two overarching dimensions: 
warmth and competence (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; 
Brambilla, Hewstone, and Colucci, 2013). Both current group activities and historical knowledge 
of group performance contribute to the stereotypes that form. Likewise, socialization entrenches 
pervasive stereotypes in society that affect the experiences of both members and non-members of 
social groups (Hyman, 1959; Tajfel, 1981). Importantly, individuals may not recognize the 
 
1 Generally, studies in the framing paradigm consider how issues are discussed and presented to 
the public, but they have not been specifically concerned with the psychological formation of 
linkages between social groups and an issue (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987; Nelson and Kinder, 
1996; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley, 1997; Druckman, 2001; Chong and Druckman, 2007).  
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influence of deeply rooted stereotypes on their perceptions of political issues; the effects of implicit 
bias are as invidious as those of explicit bias (Knoll, 2013).  
General perceptions of the political topics themselves can also shape individual 
associations between groups and issues. Issue framing and priming affect how individuals form 
connections between social groups and political issues because they influence an issue’s valence, 
whether the public assesses it as a positive or negative concern (Nelson and Kinder, 1996). But, 
existing scholarship does not focus enough on how qualities of social groups influence the manner 
in which the public connects particular groups and issues. While studies acknowledge that frames 
that include mentions of social groups can alter public opinion on issues (Rose and Baumgartner, 
2013), they do not evaluate why some groups develop connections to issues in the first place. They 
explain that the groups who benefit from policies related to an issue affect public opinion of that 
policy, but they approach their analyses from the perspective of specific political events or issues 
like a KKK rally and affirmative action rather than the social groups involved with these concerns 
(Nelson and Kinder, 1996; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley, 1997). In this paper, I address this gap 
by incorporating literature from the psychology of intergroup relations to provide insight into how 
group stereotypes and experiences can contribute to group-issue connections that feed into the 
overall framing of an issue.   
Although this chapter focuses on the associations formed between groups and issues at the 
mass level, elites play an important role in providing the political information individuals receive 
(Zaller, 1992). First, politicians and media elites can emphasize certain issues at the expense of 
others and then focus on particular political topics to maximize support for a related policy 
(Druckman, 2001). Elite members of groups with positive stereotypes can mention explicitly how 
a particular issue affects the group to ensure the linkage persists long-term. Opponents can 
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highlight issues alongside groups with negative stereotypes to draw attention to the group’s lack 
of expertise (Cuddy et al., 1999). Thus, groups sometimes struggle to control individual 
perceptions of issues in a political environment.  
Ultimately, stereotypes of groups evolve as issues evolve. For example, many initial 
victims that spoke out about sexual harassment were positively viewed celebrities who revived the 
national discussion on this issue via the #MeToo Movement. In turn, they helped develop positive 
stereotypes about sexual harassment victims and about the issue of sexual harassment (Johnson 
and Hawbaker, 2018). As time passed, more people continued to speak about the pervasiveness of 
sexual harassment, which motivated some individuals to develop a sense of doubt regarding the 
sincerity of the testimonies. The stereotypes of victims of sexual harassment started to change, and 
public opinion on this issue began to divide (Conroy, 2019).  
Aggregate opinions about both social groups and political issues should influence the 
associations the public forms between specific groups and issues. When citizens view groups 
positively, they should find it easier to connect these groups to issues they deem worthy of 
recognition and action. These same groups should also be less likely to be linked to unpopular 
issues, as an individual’s implicit bias in favor of the group should inhibit the creation of this 
connection. Conversely, individuals should be more likely to link stigmatized issues to groups with 
negative stereotypes (Feldman, 1966). For example, Gilens (2003) discusses how the American 
public believes that African Americans comprise a majority of welfare recipients. Because citizens 
often rely on negative stereotypes that portray this group as lazy, they associate the group with 
government programs designed to assist the poor and unemployed (Gilens, 2003). This 
relationship between blacks and welfare reinforces this negative stereotype and contributes to the 
stigma attached to this group. 
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Implicit bias against stigmatized groups is likely to prevent the public from associating 
popular issues with them. Because individuals strive to conserve cognitive effort, they 
unconsciously ignore information that conflicts with preexisting stereotypes (Tajfel, 1981; Kunda, 
1990). When individuals view an issue as a pressing political concern, they might not recognize 
the linkage between it and a group they do not wish to assist. Additionally, emerging new issues 
might become unpopular simply by virtue of their “natural” linkages with negatively stereotyped 
groups (e.g. gays & AIDS). Thus, some groups that wish to establish a connection to an issue will 
struggle to do so, while others should face little to no challenges based on their generally positive 
stereotypes. Finally, the associations the public forms between groups and issues should reinforce 
their overall opinions about the groups and issues themselves. Taken together, then, I posit:  
The Issue Valence Hypothesis:  
a. Individuals will be more likely to form associations between positively stereotyped 
groups and issues with a positive valence. 
b. Inversely, individuals will be more likely to form associations between negatively 
stereotyped groups and issues with a negative valence. 
In this chapter, I analyze the group-issue connections for immigration and gun control, 
where I expect issue framing and general group stereotypes to shape perceptions of the groups a 
majority of the public has in mind when thinking about these issues. In this analysis, I build off 
framing theory to offer a comprehensive perspective on how types of social groups affect the 
associations the public makes between groups and issues. Instead of evaluating the issues 
individually, I examine my theory in these contexts to understand how general group stereotypes 
and issue valence affect broader group-issue associations. By issue valence, I mean whether or not 
By unpopular, I mean issues that involve policies the public opposes, while popular issues are 
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those the public supports. For example, in the context of immigration, the public does not support 
President Trump’s proposed border wall, so this issue takes on a negative valence (Brownstein. 
2018).  
Previous research on immigration highlights the variety of frames that exist about this issue 
in political discourse. Citizens form distinct opinions based on whether or not coverage of 
immigration involves legal or illegal entry into the country (Merolla, Ramakrishan, and Haynes, 
2013).  Moreover, the images of the immigrants, namely their race and gender, portrayed in the 
media can influence support for or opposition to immigration-related policy proposals (Farris and 
Mohamed, 2018). Perceptions of an immigrant’s deservingness, often as a result of their 
occupation, can also motivate people to develop opinions in favor or against increased immigration 
(Yoo, 2008; Peterson, Slothuus, Stubager, and Togeby, 2010; Holmes and Castaneda, 2016).  
The images and frames evoked around the issue of gun control should also influence the 
connections the public forms between social groups and this issue. The politicization of gun control 
occurred later in our country’s history than that of the immigration issue, which has existed since 
the country’s founding. Beginning in the 1930s, however, gun-related policies occupied a place on 
the political agenda, as fear of crime and specific types of gun owners intensified (Gray, 2018). 
Although the National Rifle Association has existed since 1871, it established its hardline 
opposition to gun control policies in tandem with the Southern partisan realignment, in an attempt 
to court former Southern Democrats (Elving, 2017).  
Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) explain that national events like the Columbine High 
School Massacre typically reinvigorate the debate surrounding gun policies; usually, the NRA and 
other proponents of gun rights spar with groups who want to address the recent tragedies with 
stricter measures (Patterson, 1998; Spitzer, 1998). When children who elicit sympathy and pity are 
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involved in a mass shooting, the public may develop a different perspective on gun control, one 
based on the links that form between this issue and related social groups (Schneider and Ingram, 
1993; Cuddy et al., 1999). Hence, the fluctuating national dialogue surrounding gun control, much 
like immigration, likely shapes the groups that the public associates with this issue.  
VARIATION IN PERCEPTIONS OF GROUP-ISSUE LINKAGES 
 Overtime, specific links likely develop between social groups and political issues as a result 
of the historical relationship between groups and issues, issue framing, and general stereotypes. 
But, the public is not homogeneous; so, there should be individual variation in the perceived 
associations between groups and issues, produced by several factors. In particular, I argue that 
individuals are guided by their social identities when they process information related to political 
issues, and thus spontaneously connect specific groups to particular issues.  (Tajfel and Turner, 
1986; Kam, 2005; Goren et al., 2009; Hartman and Weber, 2009; Nicholson, 2011).   
Individuals belong to multiple social groups. But, when they identify with a group, they 
become more likely to evaluate information from the perspective of the group and its interests, 
rather than individual attitudes and self-interest (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Brewer, 1991). Their 
group identities also serve as lenses through which they perceive political information (Conover, 
1984). Therefore, when group identities are salient, people should recognize and form cognitive 
links between their groups and issues that affect their group’s interests. When an identity is salient, 
individuals with a strong attachment to a group will perceive their environments as an “us vs. 
them” situation, where they will view their ingroup favorably compared to other outgroups 
(Brewer, 1991).  
For this chapter, multiple identities likely influence which groups people think of when 
they consider the gun control and immigration issues. However, I focus my initial examination of 
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group-issue associations on race and gender identities, as previous research has pointed to the 
importance of these identities in shaping opinions on these issues (Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong, 
1997; Farris and Mohamed, 2018; Goss and Heaney, 2010; Enten, 2017). Because salient social 
identities motivate individuals to think on behalf of particular social groups, I posit the following: 
The Group Identity Hypothesis: Individuals who identify with a social group will be more likely 
to perceive that group as associated with a particular issue.  
While individuals belong to multiple social groups, they should be more likely to use their 
partisan identities to make sense of incoming political information (Bartels 2002). Political parties 
are the most omnipresent group in the political environment. This makes party identification a 
social identity that is chronically salient to individuals confronted with political issues, leading 
them to approach issues from a partisan perspective (Greene, 1999). 
But, crucially, this partisan perspective emanates from a foundation of different social 
groups (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002); likewise, parties have different symbolic 
ideologies (e.g. liberal vs. conservative) that revolve around social groups (Conover and Feldman, 
1981; Ellis and Stimson, 2009). Additionally, each party “owns” a specific set of political issues 
(Petrocik, 1996; Budge and Farlie, 1983). The public perceives the Democratic Party as better able 
to handle issues related to social welfare, while they regard the Republican Party as more qualified 
to deal with concerns involving government taxing and spending levels (Petrocik, Benoit, and 
Hansen, 2003).  Because the two major parties are comprised of different social groups and own 
different issues (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002, Petrocik, 1996; Budge and Farlie, 1983; 
Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994), partisans in the masses should form distinct ties between social 
groups and certain political issues. Democrats and Republicans may be more likely to view groups 
that form their party’s respective bases as more qualified to handle their party’s issues.  
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Unlike issues like education and national defense, immigration and gun control are not 
issues that the majority of the public perceives as owned by Democrats or Republicans (Petrocik, 
1996). While Egan’s (2014) framework on issue ownership may imply Republicans have an 
advantage over the Democrats in this area, we do not have any recent assessments of who owns 
immigration in the last five years. Since 2014, real world developments and political attitudes on 
immigration have changed. Dreamers have emerged as a social group that enjoys support from a 
majority of the public (CNN, 2018), and immigration policies promoted by the Trump 
Administration (e.g. a Southern border wall) are also off-putting to a majority of Americans 
(Gramlich, 2019). Taken together, recent discourse on immigration has made this issue up-for-
grabs.  
Nonetheless, people likely perceive these issues differently based on their partisanship 
because certain considerations about these areas (e.g. the deservingness of some immigrants, the 
necessity to regulate guns) may be more or less easily accessible to people depending on the 
information they receive from their copartisans in office and the media (Zaller and Feldman, 1992). 
The issue frames of immigration and gun control also likely differ across sources, which may 
motivate partisans to associate different groups with these issues (Druckman, 2001). For all of 
these reasons, I posit: 
The Party Identification Hypothesis: Republicans and Democrats will associate different 
groups with different political issues.  
 In sum, examining the connections the public makes between social groups and political 
issues will help us understand how individuals form opinions about these concerns. Additionally, 
these linkages directly influence the social groups that are perceived as most qualified to discuss 
particular political topics. Because of their historical societal and political presence, groups 
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develop general stereotypes among the public, which should influence group issue associations. 
The public should be more likely to connect positively stereotyped groups with positive issues and 
negatively stereotyped groups with negative issues (Feldman, 1966). However, perceptions of 
association should vary based on individual’s identities that moderate how they process 
information (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; Brambilla, Hewstone, 
and Colucci, 2013).   
DATA AND METHODS 
Two studies were conducted to test these hypotheses. The first study is based on data from 
an original public opinion survey created using Qualtrics, an online survey software company, and 
distributed in the fall of 2017 to a sample of the population of a large public research university in 
the South. The sample (N=708) includes students, faculty, and staff. Respondents were recruited 
via a university-wide mass email. The survey was live for a week. Participants who completed the 
survey were redirected to a separate survey where they could fill in their information to be entered 
to win one of ten $20 Amazon gift cards. 
The second study uses data from an original public opinion survey also created using 
Qualtrics that was distributed in the spring of 2017 to a sample of students at a large public research 
university in the South (N=287). The survey was live for two weeks. Respondents were enrolled 
in an Introduction to American politics class, where they were required to participate in research 
in order to earn course credit. Students received emails with links to the survey, and upon 
completion, they were redirected to a separate survey where they could enter their personal 
identification information in order to receive course credit. These data provide two distinct 
contexts in which I explored perceptions of group-issue associations.  
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In both studies, respondents were presented a list of the same ten social groups: women, 
men, whites, blacks, the rich, the poor, the middle class, the elderly, the disabled, and the homeless. 
These groups represent many of the most common social groups that are stereotyped about in the 
United States (Cuddy et al., 1999). A plethora of social groups exist outside of this chosen list, 
some of which may be more salient in the contexts of immigration and gun control. Additionally, 
these findings concerning the overall placement of group stereotypes are summary measures, so 
individual variation in beliefs about a group’s warmth or competence could exist. But, my goal 
was not to identify all possible groups, or even necessarily the most important ones. Instead, to 
provide a reasonable test of the Issue Valence Hypothesis, I included these ten groups to have a 
broad representation of the general stereotype types to compare across issue areas.2 This allowed 
me to examine whether the public associates powerful groups with positive issues and weak groups 
with negative issues. Specifically, I assessed the public’s perceptions of group-issue associations 
by asking which of the aforementioned ten groups they thought of in the contexts of immigration 
and gun control.  
In the first study, the dependent variable, perceptions of association, was measured using 
responses to an open-ended question that asked, “Please list which of the following groups (if any) 
immediately come to mind when you hear the following political issues mentioned.” This chapter 
focuses on responses to the questions about the immigration and gun control issue areas. 
Respondents had the option to write-in other groups if one outside of the ten listed came to mind 
when they thought of the issue. In the second study, perceptions of association, was measured in 
 
2 Cuddy et al. (1999) categorize stereotypes along two dimensions warmth and competence. 
Thus, combining high and low scores on the two dimensions produces a four category typology 
of stereotypes (e.g. high warmth, high competence to low warmth, low competence).  I included 
groups representing each type of stereotype. 
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a similar fashion. However, instead of an open-ended question, this survey included a close-ended 
question that asked respondents to “Please check which of the following groups immediately come 
to mind when you hear the following political issues mentioned.” Responses to these close-ended 
questions for the immigration and gun control issue areas supplement the findings in the first study.  
To test the hypotheses related to group and partisan identities, I first measured group 
membership with standard survey questions that asked respondents to provide demographic 
information about race, sex, income, and partisanship. See the Appendix A for frequency tables of 
respondents’ demographic information. The strength of party identity is measured using the 
standard ANES seven-point scale, ranging from Strong Republican to Strong Democrat. In Study 
1, based on the group membership questions for race and gender, respondents were asked two 
additional questions tapping the strength of their racial and gender identities. Specifically, identity 
strength scales were created by adding responses to questions that ask “How important is being a 
[gender group or racial group] to your identity?” and “Do you think what happens generally to 
[racial group or gender group] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your 
life?” Study 2 does not include identity strength measures. 
IMMIGRATION 
Groups the Public Associates with Immigration 
 
 What groups are associated with the issue of immigration?  Table 1 displays the groups 
that came to mind on this issue. A clear majority of respondents (62%) mentioned the poor when 
they thought of immigration. Whites, the homeless, and women rounded out the top four groups 
the public associated with immigration. Moreover, while some respondents associated multiple 
groups with immigration, 78% of people mentioned only one group when responding to this open-
ended question (see Appendix A). The public broadly perceives the poor in a negative light as a 
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result of common stereotypes surrounding their deservingness (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; 
Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; Cuddy et al., 1999). They also may evaluate immigrants in terms 
of deservingness, so this association may reinforce perceptions of the poor as a social group and 
the issue of immigration. Additionally, the racial and ethnic groups that comprise the poor may 
influence the development of this connection, as other disliked groups may shape public 
understanding of the broader “poor” social strata.   
Table 1: Study 1 Immigration Issue-Group Associations 

































































































































 As a result of the open-ended question format, respondents could mention other groups not 
listed. As seen in Table 1, 8% of respondents took advantage of this opportunity to mention more 
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issue-specific groups. Specifically, 22 people wrote “None” when selecting from the list of ten 
groups, and 7 people mentioned Hispanic/Latino individuals as the groups they associated with 
this issue area. Thirty-four percent of respondents selected none of these groups in the context of 
immigration, while 29% of respondents chose only one of the groups when answering this close-
ended question (see Table A4 Appendix A). These results suggest that if respondents were 
presented with alternative groups, they may regard them as more appropriate choices in this issue 
area than the ten I selected for this study. 
Table 2 displays the groups that Study 2 participants selected in the close-ended question 
that asked them what groups came to mind in the context of immigration. This study confirms that 
out of a list of stereotypical social groups, a majority of people (48%) connect the poor to this 
issue. The homeless also remain in the top four highest selected groups in this study, yet the middle 
class and men were selected at higher rates in this study. Thirty-four percent of respondents 
selected none of these groups in this issue domain, while 29% of respondents chose only one of 











Table 2: Study 2 Immigration Issue-Group Associations 

























































































































 These studies both demonstrate that among commonly stereotyped social groups, the 
public connects a disliked group with immigration.  This pattern of association fits with the 
negative perceptions of immigration that have resulted from contemporary political discourse 
surrounding the issue. Indeed, this negative discourse is reflected in the fact that currently only 
19% of Americans favor increasing immigration. And Americans are not alone; worldwide 
opposition to immigration is on the rise (Connor and Krogstad 2018). Moreover, negative coverage 
of immigrants themselves may influence how respondents answered these questions. The media 
constantly circulate images of a Latino male immigrant with criminal tendencies, which aligns 
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with President Trump’s commentary on “bad hombres,” reinforcing the issue’s negative valence 
(Farris and Mohamed, 2018).  
How Identities Shape Associations of Groups with Immigration  
 The above analysis suggests that the valence of a political issue is related to which social 
groups come to mind when the public thinks about the issue. A majority of respondents in both 
Study 1 and Study 2 associate the poor with the issue of immigration. However, I argue that 
perceptions of association are heterogenous because members of the public belong to different 
social groups, which could lead them to have different experiences that might influence their 
perceptions. Here, I first analyze the impact of basic group differences in terms of sex, race, income 
level, and partisanship on perceptions of immigration. However, I anticipate that group 
membership alone will not be enough to drive differences. Instead, I expect that individuals will 
need to identify with the group for it to influence their perceptions.  By “identify,” I mean that they 
recognize their group membership and hold an affective attachment to the group (Tajfel, 1981; 
Tajfel and Turner, 1986).  
 Prior to testing how social identities influence group-issue associations, a series of 
logistic regression models were employed to evaluate whether or not membership in social 
groups inspires differences. To construct the independent variables for these models, I employed 
dichotomous measures of sex (male/female), race (white/non-white), and party 
(Democrat/Republican). Because the middle class, the rich, and the poor were options 
respondents could select when responding to the questions in both Study 1 and Study 2, I also 
included a measure of income to understand how various income levels influence the groups that 
respondents identified as coming to their minds in the context of immigration. 
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Table 3 displays the results from the aforementioned logistic regression models that 
describe how group membership influences which social groups the public links to immigration. 
Specifically, these models explore how party identification and basic social groups influence 
perceptions of the top four groups in the context of immigration. When observing the effects of 
social group membership and partisanship in tandem on perceptions of association, the only 
individual variation that exists is the association of whites with immigration. Specifically, 
Democrats and Republicans differ in how frequently they connect whites to the issue of 
immigration, with Democrats being less likely to name this group as one that comes to mind when 
they think of immigration.  This model does not include group identity, but this difference may be 
the result of the social groups that comprise the bases of the two major political parties. Whites are 
more likely to vote Republican than non-whites, so this group membership may be more accessible 
in the minds of Republican respondents. If Republican respondents are indeed using their white 
identity to process information about immigration, they may see this issue in terms of their self-
interest. That is, their opinions surrounding immigration policies may be motivated by a need to 

















Table 3: How Group Membership Influences Study 1 Immigration Associations  








































































Standard errors in parentheses *indicates significance at p < 0.05 
For Table 3, Sex is dichotomous, where 0 represents male and 1 represents female. Race is dichotomous, where 0 
represents non-whites, and 1 represents whites. Party is also dichotomous where 0 represents Democrats, and 1 
represents Republicans. Income is scaled from 1-8, with 1 representing “Less than $20,000” and 8 representing 
“More than $200,000.” 
 
Table 4 displays the series of logistic regressions used to evaluate how social group 
memberships and partisanship influence the associations people form between the top ranked 
groups in Study 2 and the issue of immigration. Similar to the models in Table 3, these models 
convey how demographic factors like sex and income influence whether or not respondents 
checked the poor, the homeless, the middle class, and men when responding to the close-ended 
question that asked them to identify the groups that came to mind when they thought about the 
issue of immigration. When observing how these group memberships work together in shaping 
perceptions of immigration, no differences exist for the top four groups for this issue area. These 
results are consistent with my predictions that simple group differences should not produce 
disparities in perceptions of immigration.  
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 Table 4: How Group Membership Influences Study 2 Immigration Associations  











































































Standard errors in parentheses *indicates significance at p < 0.05 
See Table 3 for information about how variables are coded.  
 
Although respondents belong to a variety of gender, racial, class, and partisan groups, my 
hypotheses focus on how social identities with these groups affect the groups linked with 
immigration. Thus, an evaluation of identity strength is necessary to assess fully whether 
meaningful social group attachments affect the associations participants make between the ten 
groups and immigration.  
Table 5 highlights how respondents’ identities influence the groups that come to mind 
when they think of immigration. Although the identities examined here (race, gender, and party) 
do not affect perceptions of all groups, they do influence if respondents named blacks, the rich, 
and “other groups” as connected to immigration. Specifically, as gender identity strength increases, 
men are more likely than women to write in another group (see Figure 6 for the marginal effects 
plot for the interaction between sex and gender identity). In these models, income levels still 
influence whether blacks come to mind when respondents think of immigration. As income levels 
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decrease, respondents are more likely to think of blacks when they think of immigration. 
Constructing a measure of class as a social identity in future research would reveal if it, too, 
influences social group-issue associations. Finally, party identity affects whether or not 
respondents mentioned the rich as coming to mind in the context of immigration. As respondents 
identify more strongly as Democrats, they are more likely to associate the rich with immigration.  
In sum, three key identities—gender, party, and race—shape variation of perceptions of 
association of groups with immigration, thus illustrating how group-issue associations vary 
systematically in the minds of the public.  These results offer initial support to the Party 
Identification Hypothesis: party identity does inspire distinct group-issue associations. These 
findings also confirm that group identity matters in understanding the connections individuals form 
between groups and issues; however, the results do not show necessarily that respondents are 
perceiving their own gender or income groups in this issue area. Perhaps the valence of issues like 
immigration prevent respondents from naming their own groups as coming to mind in this context. 














Table 5: How Group Identity Influences Study 1 Immigration Associations 

























































































Standard errors in parentheses *indicates significance at p < 0.10 ** at p<0.05 ***at p<0.01 
Gender identity strength is scaled from 2-9, with 2 representing “Not at all Important” and 9 representing 
“Extremely Important.” Party identity is scaled from 1-7, with 1 representing a value of “Strong Republican” and 7 




Groups the Public Associates with Gun Control 
 
 To begin, the Issue Valence Hypothesis is tested by analyzing the nature of the groups that 
participants thought of with regard to the gun control issue.  Specifically, Table 6 displays the 
groups that participants in Study 1 named about gun control. Forty-seven percent of respondents 
identified men as a group they associated with gun control, closely followed by 45% of people 
mentioning whites in this issue area. Men and whites benefit from generally positive societal 
stereotypes, as the public perceives both of these groups as warm and competent (Cuddy, Fiske, 
and Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; Cuddy et al., 1999). The rich and the middle class 
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round out the top four groups associated with this issue. Unlike on immigration, the “Other” option 
was the least popular in this study for gun control; only three respondents chose this option to 
name the NRA as a group that they thought of for gun control.  
Table 6: Study 1 Gun Control Issue-Group Associations 
























































































Overall, these data suggest that the public associates positive groups with gun control. 
These links may be the result of existing issue framing; but regardless of their origins, they should 
produce more positive perceptions of gun policy itself. While opinions on gun control may differ, 
the connections that form between this issue and stereotypically positive groups convey that it is 
an issue the public should view as worthy of attention. 
Table 7 displays the groups that participants in Study 2 selected as those that came to mind 
when they thought of gun control. Once again, men and whites were the top two groups mentioned, 
as 51% and 49% of respondents selected them as answers to their close-ended question, 
respectively. Although the order of the middle class and the rich switches in this study, these 
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groups remain in the top four selected. Twenty-two percent of respondents selected three groups 
from the list of ten, but 22% of respondents also did not select any of the groups (See Table A7 
Appendix A). The data from this study convey the same trend as Study 1: namely, the public links 
positively stereotyped groups to the gun control issue area. While this analysis does not trace the 
origins of these associations, the data do provide support for the Issue Valence Hypothesis. The 
context of gun control and immigration differ, and the groups the public connects to these areas 
may be a product or a driver of the disparate coverage of them by elites and the media.  
Table 7: Study 2 Gun Control Issue-Group Associations 

















































































How Identities Shape Associations of Groups with Gun Control  
 Although a majority of respondents in both Study 1 and Study 2 selected the same four 
groups as being associated with gun control, their identities should moderate these connections. 
While members of the public belong to an array of social groups, I argue that heterogenous 
perceptions of association result, in part, from salient social identities, not simply membership. In 
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this issue area, I first explore the Group Identity and Partisan Identification Hypotheses by 
analyzing the effects of sex, race, income, and party on the associations people form between social 
groups and gun control. Then, I compare the effects of group membership with those of identity.  
Table 8 displays a series of logistic regression models that were used to evaluate if simple 
group differences influenced the associations respondents formed between the top ranked groups 
and the issue of gun control. Individual differences exist in perceptions of all of the top four groups 
in the context of gun control. Men and women differ in their perceptions of whether or not men 
come to mind when they think of gun control. Female respondents are more likely to associate 
men with this issue than male respondents. Race and party shape the association of whites with 
gun control. Non-whites are more likely to perceive whites as connected to this issue. Democrats 
are also more likely to link whites to gun control than Republicans, and Republicans are more 
likely to connect the middle class to this issue than Democrats. Finally, the higher the respondent’s 
income, the less likely they are to think of the rich in this issue area.  
Collectively, these findings suggest that membership in particular groups encourages 
respondents to connect relevant outgroups to gun control. Belonging to these broad demographic 
groups could produce social identities over time, and these identities that develop may influence 
how respondents think about the issue of gun control. However, in this analysis, no measures of 








Table 8: How Group Membership Influences Study 1 Gun Control Associations 








































































Standard errors in parentheses *indicates significance at p < 0.05 
See Table 3 for information about how variables are coded.  
 
Table 9 displays a series of logistic regressions used to evaluate how group differences 
shape associations between social groups and gun control in Study 2. Similar to the models in 
Table 8, these models convey how demographic factors like sex and income influence whether 
respondents mentioned the poor, the homeless, the middle class, and men when responding to the 
close-ended question that asked them to identify the groups that came to mind when they thought 
about gun control. Although the differences were not as great as those in Study 1, individual 
demographics continue to shape perceptions of association in this study. Sex differences exist 
when evaluating the association of men and gun control. Income, race, and party influence whether 
respondents selected the middle class when they thought of gun control. Finally, whites are more 
likely than non-whites to perceive the rich as connected to gun control. 
  The results from this study highlight how group membership inspires variation in the links 
people form between social groups and gun control. Specifically, demographic differences 
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influence whether people form connections between class groups and gun control. The bases of 
the Democratic and Republican Parties are comprised of different class groups, which may 
motivate people to develop alternative outlooks on this issue area. Individuals with higher levels 
of socioeconomic status tend to support the Republican Party at higher rates than those with lower 
socioeconomic status. However, without examining social identity strength, I cannot determine 
what particular effect of belonging to these groups inspired differences in perceptions of 
association. 
Table 9: How Group Membership Influences Study 2 Gun Control Associations 









































































Standard errors in parentheses *indicates significance at p < 0.05 
See Table 3 for information about how variables are coded.  
 
 Although respondents’ demographic groups certainly separated respondents in their 
associations of groups with gun control, a further examination of their social identities is 
necessary to evaluate the Group Membership Hypothesis and Partisan Identification Hypothesis. 
Thus, an evaluation of identity strength is necessary to understand whether meaningful social 
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group attachments affect the associations participants make between the ten groups and gun 
control. 
 Table 10 conveys how individual identities shape group-issue associations for gun control. 
In this context, the identities examined in this analysis affect whether respondents perceive men, 
whites, the rich, the poor, and women as connected to the issue of gun control. Gender identity 
moderates whether respondents associate men and whites with gun control (See Figures A2, A3, 
and A5 for the marginal effects plots for the interaction between sex and gender identity strength).  
As gender identity strength increases, women are more likely to associate men with gun control, 
while men are less likely. Additionally, as gender identity strength increases, women are more 
likely to associate whites with gun control, while men are less likely. Finally, as gender identity 
strength increases, men are more likely than women to think of women in the context of gun 
control.  
Other identities also influence the associations individuals form between the listed groups 
and the gun control issue area. Racial identity influences whether respondents connect the poor to 
gun control. As their racial identity strength increases, whites are more likely than nonwhites to 
associate the poor with gun control (See Figure 9 for the marginal effects plot for the interaction 
of race and racial identity strength). Although income level does not measure class identity 
strength, it does still influence the connections respondents form between the rich and gun control 
when controlling for the other identities examined. As income levels increase, respondents are less 
likely to associate the rich with gun control. 
Unlike in the case of immigration, these results for gun control do not lend support to the 
Party Identification Hypothesis. But, once again, they do indicate that group identity matters in 
shaping the connections people make between social groups and an issue. Gender identity strength 
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and racial identity strength influence respondents’ propensity to connect whites and the poor to 
gun control. As gender identity strength among women increases, they are more likely to associate 
whites with gun control. As racial identity strength among whites increases, they are more likely 
to associate the poor with gun control. However, these trends do not comport with the original 
hypothesis that asserts respondents are more likely to think of their own groups when their 
identities are salient. Their group identities may provide a unique lens through which they make 
connections between these specific groups and gun control, despite these identities apparently not 
motivating them to think of this issue in terms of their own groups. 
 In other cases, these results appear to motivate the opposite trend; as identity strength 
increases, individuals are less likely to think of their own groups in the context of gun control. 
Specifically, as gender identity strength increases among women, they are more likely to think of 
men in the context of gun control. Perhaps their opinions on the issue and the valence of the issue 












Table 10: How Group Identity Influences Study 1 Gun Control Associations 





































































































































Standard errors in parentheses *indicates significance at p < 0.10 ** at p<0.05 
See Table 3 for more information about how other variables are coded.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 The above analysis of the associations people form between social groups and political 
issues provides evidence in support of the Issue Valence Hypothesis—social groups tend to be 
linked to issues that share the same valence (i.e. positively stereotyped groups linked to positive 
issues and negatively stereotyped groups linked to negative issues). Thus, these links can reinforce 
the public’s perceptions of both the groups and the issues involved. Out of the ten groups that 
represent a variety of general stereotypes, a majority of respondents in both studies identified the 
poor as the group that immediately came to mind when they thought of immigration. According 
to the Stereotype Content Model, individuals perceive the poor as low warmth and low 
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competence, the most detrimental combination of group stereotypes (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 
2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; Cuddy et al., 1999). This association of a weak group with 
this issue likely reinforces the anti-immigrant sentiment highlighted in the media (Farris and 
Mohamed, 2018). It should also affect how the public perceives policies related to immigration. If 
they connect negative groups to this issue, they may not approve of increased immigration and 
instead prefer stricter immigration policies. Their preconceptions about the issue of immigration 
and the prototypical immigrant may also affect the groups they selected in the two studies. 
 Both studies also reveal that a majority of respondents link men to the issue of gun control. 
While the poor suffer as a result of their general stereotypes, individuals generally perceive men 
as high on the competence dimension and medium to high on the warmth dimension (Cuddy et al., 
2009). Unlike the immigration context where a clear majority mentioned the poor, respondents in 
both Study 1 and Study 2 mentioned whites almost as frequently as they mentioned men in the 
context of gun control. However, whites also benefit from generally positive stereotypes, which 
suggests that respondents may develop distinct perspectives on this issue.  
The groups that the public associates with issues are important apart from their potential 
effects on group stereotypes and issue opinions. These connections fundamentally alter the manner 
in which people consume and process information about these issues, which contributes to a deeper 
understanding of public opinion. Additionally, these connections directly influence the groups the 
public deems qualified to speak about these issues, as the psychological process of associating 
groups and issues occurs prior to any evaluation of authority.  
 A majority of respondents associate the poor and men with immigration and gun control, 
respectively. While analyzing the public as a single unit allows us to understand aggregate trends 
and opinions, citizens belong to a host of social groups. While I expected salient group identities 
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to shape respondents’ understanding of the links between groups and issues, some simple group 
differences between the sexes, races, and income groups also shape individual associations. 
Though identities as a whole contribute to more differences in individual perceptions of the groups 
they connect to both immigration and gun control. The results support the Party Identification 
Hypothesis, as party identity strength inspires different group-issue associations between 
Republicans and Democrats.  
While group identity also inspires the same trends, producing differences in perceptions of 
the groups respondents connect to immigration and gun control, the findings did not show that 
these group identities motivate individuals to perceive their own groups as connected to these 
areas. Further analysis is necessary to examine the Group Identity Hypothesis. An evaluation of 
different issue areas may provide more insight into the role of group identity in shaping the 
particular groups people associate with political concerns. 
 A few noteworthy limitations of this study exist and should be addressed in future research. 
First, I only focused on prompting people with a list of 10 social groups, which restricted the ability 
for respondents to deliberate fully on the issues and name the groups that immediately came to 
mind when they thought of them. This abridged selection of groups proved especially problematic 
in the context of immigration where I did not include Latinos. The 10 groups that I selected do not 
possess noteworthy experiences within these two issue areas; yet in this initial examination, I 
needed to construct a concise list in order to facilitate comparisons between the types of groups 
that people associate with different issue areas to test the Issue Valence Hypothesis. 
 Second, the two samples serve as major hindrances in this study. Their lack of 
representativeness prevents me from generalizing the findings to the population as a whole. This 
shortcoming may contribute to the type of group membership differences I found in this study. 
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However, these student samples should have the greatest impact on the particular groups 
respondents select as connected to the two issues, but not the type of group people select. Thus, 
the samples do not impede my ability to test the Issue Valence Hypothesis. Additionally, this issue 
should not affect whether or not the identities of the respondents affect the group-issue associations 
they form.  
When political elites in office and in the media make explicit associations between groups 
and issues, they may aim to sway public opinion in a particular direction. However, this paper 
reveals that the public associates different groups with the same issue. These associations vary 
systematically in the minds of the public according to their party and group identities, and even 
just group membership. The results supporting the Issue Valence Hypothesis indicate that these 
associations can color the issues. While some groups may struggle as a result of these differences, 
others may wish to be associated with issues in order to serve as credible sources of information 
about them. In fact, understanding these associations is critical in order for me to evaluate the 
groups that can speak on the issue. These links influence perceptions of group competence in an 




















CHAPTER 3: CULTIVATING COMPETENCE: AN EXAMINATION OF SOCIAL 
GROUP ISSUE AUTHORITY 
 
 
In 2015, an Ohio proposal to ban abortions to terminate Down syndrome pregnancies drew 
national attention because the plan pitted the disabled community, who favored the ban, against 
women, who felt their rights to abortion access were threatened (Lewin, 2015). To the public at 
large, it was clear which side of the bill was championed by each side. Critically, both groups 
appeared authoritative and informed, which only heightened the controversy and made it difficult 
for the public to know which side of the bill to favor. Ultimately, citizens must decide whose 
voice—activists speaking for the disabled or women—carries the most weight on this issue. 
This is a common occurrence.  Social groups are often associated with specific sides on 
policy issues by political leaders, the media, and citizens.  For example, during her 2016 
presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton made pay equity a priority stressing that it was an issue that 
women championed (Bischoff, 2015). Likewise, recently the mainstream media has devoted 
greater attention to the racial inequities in the criminal justice system and policing because the 
#BlackLivesMatter Movement has made those issues salient (Jones, 2015).  
These cases highlight relationships between specific social groups and political issues. 
However, political scientists have not thoroughly analyzed how the public perceives these 
connections. Specifically, when these groups talk, do they speak with a voice of authority? I argue 
that perceived social group-issue linkages impact a group’s issue authority. Grounded in a group’s 
perceived competence in a specific issue domain, issue authority functions as a psychological 
 42 
factor that I explore in this chapter. In addition to shaping issue perceptions in the mass public, the 
presence of issue authority should affect if an issue is viewed as important and worthy of action. 
So, because issue authority likely has important consequences, it is important to understand 
variations in perceptions of issue authority. 
In this chapter, I explain how citizen characteristics like education levels, as well as overall 
group competence, shape a group’s perceived issue authority. Theoretically, I argue that groups 
that have authority are qualified to speak about an issue and shape the broader societal discussion 
of it. Then, on three different issues—the #MeToo Movement, gun control, and immigration—I 
apply this theoretical framework to explain how issue authority varies across citizens and groups. 
These issues are similar in important ways, as they currently have inspired social movements 
among the mass public. Further, they exist in relatively fixed realms due to related Supreme Court 
cases that provide legal precedent that may interfere with attempts to implement policy change.  
Based on my analysis, I conclude that a group’s issue authority is context-specific, and 
importantly the life experiences of group members—victimhood, for example—matter to the 
public. In specific terms, these findings reveal the groups people regard as issue authorities on the 
#MeToo Movement, gun control, and immigration. More generally, our understanding of the role 
social groups play in politics is advanced by moving beyond general group stereotypes. 
Additionally, this research enriches our understanding of how social groups influence the 
perception of salient political issues. 
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL GROUP ISSUE AUTHORITY 
 I argue that citizens think about political issues in terms of the social groups that are 
connected to them. Both their stereotypes of the groups and the groups’ perceived relationship to 
issues should influence how people process information about political issues (Cuddy, Fiske, and 
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Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; Cuddy et al., 1999). Groups that have issue authority 
are viewed as qualified sources of information. To understand the origins and qualities of a group’s 
issue authority, I propose that the relationship between the group and the issue exists on two 
dimensions: association and competence (Walgrave, Levere, and Tresch, 2012). Prior to evaluating 
a group’s qualification to speak about an issue, a person must form a link or an association between 
the group and the issue.  Once a group is associated with an issue, its competence can be assessed, 
where competence is a group’s ability to be an effective political actor on the issue. Competence 
is a product of a group’s general stereotypes and its unique experiences with an issue. Stereotypical 
and experiential competence combine to translate into a group’s issue authority. 
Recognizing the existence of both group-issue linkages and the influence of group issue 
authority deepens our understanding of the issues involved, and how the public takes cues from 
sources in their environment. People often process information about political issues based 
primarily on how they will influence their social groups: they tend to follow ingroup or identity-
based cues and support policies that benefit their groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Kam, 2005; 
Goren et al., 2009; Hartman and Weber, 2009; Nicholson, 2011). But, group members do not only 
or always follow ingroup sources (Chaiken, 1980; Conover, 1988; Kunda, 1990).  
Specifically, expert cues are perceived to be more objective than identity-based cues, and 
non-group members still find such cues persuasive (Wiener and Mowen, 1986). Lupia and 
McCubbins (1998) also explain that common interests between representatives and the public do 
not translate necessarily into persuasive source cues. While political scientists have not applied 
these findings to the relationships between social groups and political issues, I do. This theory 
builds upon the scholarship of Lupia and McCubbins (1998) who argue that external forces outside 
of perceived common interests can assist individuals in making decisions consistent with their core 
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interests, though my analysis centers on the public’s perception of social groups instead of 
politicians or political institutions. Specifically, I argue that expert source cues are contextual in 
nature: the public perceives particular groups as authorities in specific issue domains. 
Groups may have multiple issue areas of perceived authority—or none. Thus, the public is 
likely to perceive a specific group as the most qualified to discuss a particular political issue, 
resulting in it possessing authority over a given issue domain. Critically, often much of the public 
may not belong to the group recognized as having expertise on an issue. Yet, the public’s trust in 
this “expert” group should allow it, nonetheless, to serve as an authoritative source of information 
that can wield significant power in shaping perceptions of an issue.  
THE COMPETENCE DIMENSION 
 The perceived competence of a social group is central to determining its “issue authority.” 
I argue that the perceived “competence” of a social group in a particular issue domain depends 
upon two group characteristics: its stereotypical competence, and its experiential competence. 
Most social groups have a holistic stereotypical reputation that falls along two dimensions: 
warmth and competence (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; 
Brambilla, Hewstone, and Colucci, 2013). While it is beyond the scope of this work to provide a 
detailed account of the origins of such stereotypes, some of the key factors shaping stereotypes 
include: culture, socialization, and the media (Hyman, 1959; Tajfel, 1981; Cuddy, Fiske, and 
Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; Mastro, 2009; Brambilla, Hewstone, and Colucci, 
2013). Stereotypes on the competence dimension —such as believing a group to be intelligent and 
efficient—should directly influence perceptions of group expertise in an issue area (Brambilla et 
al., 2013; Cuddy et al., 2008). Moreover, positive or negative stereotypes on the warmth dimension 
should accentuate the impact of these competence traits. Thus, groups stereotyped as both 
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intelligent and friendly should be even more likely to be seen as competent in an issue area; 
conversely, groups stereotyped as both unintelligent and cold should be perceived as especially 
incompetent. Still, even disliked groups can maintain reputations as being generally competent 
members of society (Cuddy et al., 1999).  
Beyond a group’s stereotypical competence, a second key factor contributing to issue 
authority is whether a group is perceived to have a first-hand involvement with and understanding 
of the issue, or experiential competence. To explain, the effects of social problems on group 
members create distinct experiences that develop an appreciation of an issue’s complexity and its 
human consequences. Typically, this understanding cannot be replicated by non-group members 
because they have not had—and cannot have—the same experiences. For example, women 
exclusively breastfeed, providing them with a wealth of experience on the issue. Consequently, 
some view women themselves as more credible sources on policies surrounding breastfeeding in 
the workplace (Bridges, Frank, and Curtin, 1997; Galtry, 2000; Tuhus, 2001; Polston Mills, 2009). 
Thus, groups perceived as having experiential competence on an issue effectively possess 
resources over that given issue domain giving them “competence in context.”   
People learn about experiential competence through exposure to group narratives via the 
news, through social media, etc. Narratives are more persuasive than impersonal reports, so they 
are important for convincing people in general, and they are particularly important for stigmatized 
groups (Slater and Rouner, 2002; Oliver et al., 2012; Shen, Ahern, and Baker, 2014). In sum, I 
argue that the public perceives some groups as having greater experiential competence: more 
experience with and therefore a better understanding of an issue.  
Finally, a third factor that might influence perceptions of issue authority is group affect. 
From a theoretical perspective, group affect is likely to be intertwined with a group’s experiential 
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competence and especially it’s stereotypical competence.  Indeed, empirical attempts to unravel 
the causal effects of group affect and stereotypes have shown that it is difficult to untangle the 
causality between the two. The key meta-analysis examining the causal relationship between the 
two concludes that causality more likely runs from stereotypes to affect; but some studies find the 
opposite (see Riek, Mania and Gaertner 2006; Hamilton, Stroessner, and Mackie, 1993 also, 
Jackson et al., 1997; Aberson and Gaffney 2008). From my perspective, it is not essential for 
understanding a group’s authority on certain issues to focus either theoretically or empirically on 
parsing out the effects of group affect from those of stereotypical competence and experiential 
competence. Thus, for the sake of parsimony, I focus on competence, assuming group affect is 
interwoven with it.  
ISSUE AUTHORITY IN CONTEXT 
“Issue authority” is produced by the combination of experiential competence and 
stereotypical competence. Importantly, then, “issue authority” is domain-specific.  Groups that 
have “issue authority” have power in a particular context that shapes how individuals perceive 
incoming information about a constellation of related issues. For example, women may have “issue 
authority” in the area of educational policies; but their issue authority in that domain has no 
necessary bearing on their authority in other domains like defense policy.  
So, “issue authority” refers to a group’s ability to be a persuasive source of information, in 
a particular issue domain. Thus, a group with “issue authority” can produce source cues that the 
public is likely to follow when evaluating issues in a specific area. Groups that possess issue 
authority in a specific issue context should be deemed experts not only by group members, but 
also by other members of the public. This is so because, as Weiner and Mowen (1986) explain, 
expertise is a component of source credibility that is evaluated more objectively than trust and 
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attractiveness, a pattern that should extend to groups. To study issue authority, I focus on three 
distinct issue domains: the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control.  
 Anita Hill’s testimony during Clarence Thomas’ confirmation to the Supreme Court 
brought the issue of sexual harassment into the public consciousness (Jacobs, 2018). Yet, the 
#MeToo Movement has renewed the attention to this issue, beginning with Tarana Burke coining 
the phrase, “Me Too,” in 2006. The #MeToo Movement began in October 2017 when Alyssa 
Milano urged victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault to reply to her Twitter post with the 
phrase “Me Too” (Johnson and Hawbaker, 2018). Though sexual harassment is not a new issue, 
the lens through which the #MeToo Movement presents the issue does not yet inspire staunch 
divides between partisans in the United States, as both Republicans and Democrats are supporters 
and opponents of the movement. Recent polling in the summer and fall of 2018 has shown that the 
politicization of this issue is imminent, as Republicans are beginning to develop an increased 
skepticism of women in sexual harassment cases (Conroy, 2019) Because of the movement’s short 
lifespan, the public also may not possess a clear understanding of the main actors involved in it. 
Additionally, their general knowledge of the #MeToo Movement may not be high due to its short 
presence on the general political agenda (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1997). 
 While the #MeToo Movement occupies a recent space in political discourse at the mass 
and elite level, gun control is an older issue that has sparked debates since the beginning of the 20th 
century. In the 1930’s, political elites began talking about potential gun policies as a response to 
increased fear of crime and other types of gun violence (Gray, 2018). The politicization of this 
issue continued to intensify in the 1960’s as the National Rifle Association developed its now 
infamous staunch opposition to gun restrictions in an effort to court new southern Republicans 
(Elving, 2017). Currently, mass shootings have reinvigorated the debates around gun policies that 
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pit the NRA against groups who want to implement harsh anti-gun measures (Patterson, 1998; 
Spitzer, 1998).  
Ultimately, a stark partisan divide exists in this is issue domain, as Democrats are more 
supportive of gun control than their Republican counterparts (Enten, 2017). Despite partisan 
polarization, types of people appearing in coverage of gun control have fluctuated over time, 
ranging from mothers to students to felons, which may create an ambiguous environment in terms 
of social group association (Goss and Heaney, 2010; Enten, 2017).  
Immigration debates have existed in the United States since its founding (Archdeacon, 
1983; Jones, 1992; Higham, 1988; Glass, 2012). Thus, this issue is the oldest that I explore, which 
will provide a comprehensive overview of the contexts of social group-issue authority. In the 19th 
and 20th century, waves of emigrants left their home countries to escape persecution or pursue 
economic opportunities in the United States (Zeitz, 2017). Though prejudice toward these groups 
has existed since these groups’ arrival in America, clear partisan disparities did not arise until 2006 
when President George W. Bush’s immigration reform bill inspired new rhetoric involving border 
security, crime, and the legalization process (Thompson, 2018). Following the failure of this bill, 
Democrats and Republicans diverged, with Democrats adopting a pro-immigration stance, and 
their Republican counterparts opposing naturalization attempts and developing increasing 
skepticism of increased immigration rates (Thompson, 2018). Despite the durability of this issue, 
the public does not necessarily possess a factual understanding of the groups affected by it, as 
Latinos occupy popular discourse surrounding immigration, but Asians account for the largest 
share of new immigrants in the country (Smith, 2018). This disparity suggests that political 
knowledge on this issue fluctuates across members of the public. 
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VARIATION IN PERCEPTIONS OF ISSUE AUTHORITY 
 On my account, the “issue authority” of a social group in particular issue domain is a 
function of stereotypical competence and experiential competence. However, the public should 
vary in their perceptions of both of these components, which should affect the perceived authority 
of social groups in the contexts of the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control. 
Specifically, individuals have different identities that should shape how they process information 
related to the issues and the social groups connected to these issues (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Kam, 
2005; Goren et al., 2009; Hartman and Weber, 2009; Nicholson, 2011). These individual 
differences in perceptions of issue authority are the focus of my empirical inquiry. 
 People belong to a host of social groups. However, when one group identity is salient, an 
individual becomes more likely to perceive incoming information from the perspective of that 
group and its interests instead of their self-interest (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Brewer, 1991). Their 
group identities also function as lenses through which they perceive political information 
(Conover, 1984). Essentially, when one group identity is salient, “I” becomes “we,” and 
individuals regard their surroundings as an “us vs. them” situation in which they strive to benefit 
their ingroup at the expense of an outgroup or outgroups (Brewer, 1991).  
 Multiple identities should affect the groups viewed as issue authorities for the #MeToo 
Movement, gun control, and immigration. In this study, I focus on how gender and racial identities 
influence perceptions of issue authority. Previous studies have explored how these identities shape 
public opinion on the three issue domains (Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong, 1997; Farris and 
Mohamed, 2018; Goss and Heaney, 2010; Enten, 2017; Conroy, 2019), so I expect them to be 
relevant and important characteristics that motivate individuals to select different groups as the 
most qualified to discuss the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control. Salient social 
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identities motivate people to think on behalf of their group instead of their individual concerns, so 
I posit:   
The Group Identity Hypothesis: Individuals who belong to a social group will be more likely to 
perceive that group as qualified to speak about a political issue. 
 Partisanship should also play a prominent role in understanding the groups individuals 
deem most qualified to talk about these three areas. Political parties are a constant presence in the 
political environment, and thus party identity is chronically salient and accessible when citizens 
process political information (Greene, 1999). Disparate coalitions of social groups comprise the 
parties’ bases (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002) and also motivate the parties’ different 
symbolic ideologies (e.g. liberal vs. conservative) (Conover and Feldman, 1981; Ellis and Stimson, 
2009). Importantly, both political parties have a reputation of “owning” different issues (Budge 
and Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996): for example, Democrats have authority over social welfare 
issues, while Republicans are seen as better equipped to handle taxing and spending issues 
(Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen, 2003). Because the two major parties are comprised of different 
social groups and own different issues (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002, Petrocik, 1996; 
Budge and Farlie, 1983; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1994), partisans should form distinct links 
between social groups and political issues.  
Although the three issues explored here are not owned by the two parties, Democrats and 
Republicans should be more likely to view groups that form their party’s respective bases as 
competent to handle these concerns. Moreover, the framing of these issues by many media outlets 
and the government is likely to have a partisan slant (Zaller and Feldman, 1992).  Because party 
functions as a social identity, respondents whose party identities are salient should be more likely 
to identify these core groups that comprise their respective bases as qualified to discuss each of 
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the three issue areas (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Greene, 1999). For example, strong Republicans 
may regard gun owners as more qualified to discuss gun control because gun owners are 
predominately white men, who also tend to be more supportive of the Republican Party (Parker et 
al., 2017). Therefore, I posit: 
The Party Identity Hypothesis: 
a.  Republicans and Democrats will select different social groups as having greater issue 
authority in each of the three issue domains. 
b. Partisans with stronger identities will be more likely to identify their natural constituencies 
as the most qualified to discuss their natural constituencies than partisans with weaker 
identities.  
 Education should also contribute to variation in perceptions of issue authority. Generally, 
increased levels of education contribute positively to the availability of the cognitive resources and 
political knowledge necessary to make sense of incoming news (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1997). 
Thus, people who are better able to interpret the context of information about these issues may 
rank groups with experiential competence as more qualified to speak about them than people 
without this level of cognition. Because individuals learn about a group’s relationship to an issue 
via the media and their interactions with group members, those with higher levels of education 
should possess a deeper awareness of a group’s experiences with a particular concern. Greater 
exposure to narratives as a result of their ability to process political news and information should 
provide educated individuals with an understanding of unique experiences and prevent them from 
defaulting to societal stereotypes when deciding the groups that are most qualified to speak in a 
certain context (Slater and Rouner, 2002; Oliver et al., 2012; Shen, Ahern, and Baker, 2014). For 
all of these reasons, I offer two final hypotheses: 
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The Education Hypothesis:  
a. Individuals with higher education levels will perceive different groups as having greater 
issue authority than those with lower levels of education. 
b. Specifically, individuals with higher education levels will select groups with higher levels 
of experiential competence as having greater issue authority than groups with higher levels 
of stereotypical competence. 
DATA AND METHODS 
 I examine social group issue authority in three issue domains: the #MeToo Movement, 
immigration, and gun control using an original public opinion survey created using Qualtrics, an 
online survey software company. The survey was distributed to a national sample (N=524) and is 
representative of the population with respect to age, sex, and partisanship (see Appendix A for 
detailed demographic breakdown of the sample).  
Studying issue authority in three domains requires exploring the issue authority of dozens 
of groups. However, I do not measure directly either stereotypical or experiential competence.  
To do so would have been impractical given that assessing each construct would have required 
asking respondents multiple items for a single group. Moreover, without any experimental 
treatment, it would have been impossible to draw any causal inferences about the relationship 
between issue competence and issue authority.  Instead, my focus here is on explaining 
individual variations in perceptions of issue authority.  
Therefore, I focus on explaining variations in perceptions of issue authority.  Nonetheless, 
it is essential to have a range of groups that represent the universe of groups for stereotypical and 
experiential competence. 
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 For each issue, the universe of groups selected for analysis of issue authority differed in 
their association with the issue and together varied in both stereotypical and experiential 
competence. To attain variations in stereotypical competence, from positive to negative, I selected 
a range of groups that are representative of the four categories defined by high and low scores on 
the two basic dimensions of stereotypes: competence and warmth (Cuddy et al., 2008). For 
example, I included Whites (HC-HW), children (LC-HW), the rich (HC-LW), the poor (LC-LW) 
in the immigration question. I also included Whites (HC-HW), Blacks (MC-MW), and the poor 
(LC-LW) in the context of the #MeToo Movement.  
Variations in experiential competence were maximized by conducting several pretests to 
nominate specific groups that people associate with the three issues. Based on the results from the 
survey pretests, I also selected groups that had appeared recently in news coverage surrounding 
each issue, but that differ in how directly they are affected by the issue. Groups like millennials, 
victims of sexual harassment, and celebrities appeared in the #MeToo Movement question. The 
immigration question included undocumented immigrants, Dreamers, and blue-collar workers. 
Finally, victims of gun violence, mothers, gun owners, and rural residents served as options in the 
gun control question. (See Appendix B for a full list of groups for each issue.) (See Appendix D 
for more information on the pretests to nominate groups).  
Assessed Competence 
Assessed measures of stereotypical and experiential group competence were created by 
ranking the groups based on previous research (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and 
Glick, 2008; Cuddy et al., 1999) and their experiences within an issue domain. These measures 
provide a baseline for predicting what issue authority might be in the absence of variations among 
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the public. However, these measures of stereotypical and experiential competence are summary 
measures, and individual variation likely exists.  
Specifically, for the stereotypical competence measure, groups, like Whites, that are high 
on both dimensions received a two, while groups, like the rich, that are high on one dimension 
(competence in this case), received a one. Groups, like the poor, that are low on both dimensions 
received a zero. I evaluated the groups’ levels of experiential competence in a similar fashion. 
Groups that are directly affected by an issue (e.g. undocumented immigrants and immigration) 
received a two, while groups that are indirectly affected by an issue received a one (e.g. Latinos 
and immigration). Groups with no connection to an issue area received a zero. Then, a group’s 
overall assessed competence on an issue is the sum of their stereotypical and experiential 
competence on the issue. This assumes that citizens weigh stereotypical and experiential 
competence equally when assessing issue authority. There are no theoretical grounds for weighing 
one dimension more heavily than the other. To the extent the public’s rankings of groups deviates 
from the following rankings, it will be an indicator of the validity of this assumption. 
Table 11 displays the assessed competence rankings of groups for the #MeToo Movement. 
Victims of sexual harassment, single women, and working women rank as the three most qualified 
groups to discuss the #MeToo Movement. These groups all received two points for experiential 
competence and one for stereotypical competence because the public likely perceives them in a 
similar manner as they perceive women—low competence, high warmth (Cuddy et al., 1999). (See 












Victims of sexual 
harassment  
2 1 3 
Single women 2 1 3 
Working women 2 1 3 
Men 1 1 2 
Whites 1 1 2 
Celebrities 1 1 2 
LGBTQ 1 1 2 
Millennials  1 1 2 
Blacks 0 1 2 
The disabled 0 1 1 
The poor 0 0 0 
 
Table 12 displays the rankings of groups for immigration based on the aggregate assessed 
competence measure. There is less variation in assessed competence across these groups for 
immigration as compared to those for the #MeToo movement.  Moreover, these groups do not 
score as highly as those for the #MeToo movement, largely because the groups selected because 
of their experiences with immigration have lower stereotypical competence. Latinos, 
undocumented immigrants, Whites, Asians, and children emerge as the higher ranked groups. 
However, none of these groups scored a three like the top groups in the #MeToo Movement issue 












Dreamers 2 1 3 
Undocumented 
immigrants 
2 0 2 
Asians 1 1 2 
Latinos 1 1 2 
Whites 0 2 2 
Children 1 1 2 
Muslims 1 0 1 
The rich 0 1 1 
The poor 1 0 1 
Blue collar 
workers 
0 1 1 
 
 Finally, Table 13 conveys the assessed competence ratings of groups for the gun control 
issue area. Victims of gun violence, mothers, students, and rural residents are the highest ranked 
groups. This issue area falls between the #MeToo Movement and immigration in terms of the 
number of highly ranked groups. These top four groups more closely resemble those in the domain 
of the #MeToo Movement, as they scored a three on the combined measures of stereotypical and 















Victims of gun 
violence 
2 1 3 
Mothers 1 2 3 
Students 2 1 3 
Rural residents 1 2 3 
Gun owners 2 1 3 
Veterans 1 1 2 
Whites 0 2 2 
Blacks 1 1 2 
Men 0 1 1 
The disabled 0 1 1 
The poor 0 0 0 
 
 
Measures of Perceived Authority  
 
The aggregate assessed measures of competence provide a basis for predicting which 
groups people will perceive as qualified to speak in the three issue domains.  But, issue authority 
is about individual perceptions of group competence, not assessed evaluations. Thus, I analyze 
data from the representative public opinion survey to understand the groups the public actually 
regard as authorities on the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control. 
For this analysis, the dependent variable is “issue authority in context.” For each of the 
three issues, issue authority was measured by asking respondents the following question: 
 “For the following political issue, rank the groups (if any) that are the most qualified to 
talk about the issue, with 1 being the most qualified and 11 being the least qualified. You 
may drag the groups around to rank them according to your preference.”  
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Respondents ranked the groups listed earlier in Tables 11-13 for, respectively, each of the three 
issues: the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control.  The advantage of this question 
format was that it allowed citizens to pick from among a wide range of groups that had authority 
to speak on an issue, and it facilitated comparisons between groups. (See Appendix C for tables 
displaying the average perceived authority for all groups in each of the three issue areas). Thus, 
this measure of issue authority allows for easy comparisons to the assessed aggregate measure of 
competence, which should be a good predictor of the overall public’s perceptions of issue 
authority, though I do not expect the two lists to match perfectly because other factors outside of 
the model that I excluded for the sake of parsimony should also shape issue authority. (See 
Appendix C for figures that display the correlation between assessed competence and average 
perceived authority for all groups in each of the three issue domains.) 
In order to simplify the comparisons between the groups across issue domains, I collapsed 
the rankings into four categories. First, I reverse-coded the rankings, so that 12 or 11 represents 
the most qualified group, and 1 represents the least qualified group. For each issue, I then combined 
the new rankings of 1, 2, and 3 into category 4, which represents the least qualified group. Next, I 
combined rankings of 4, 5, and 6 into the new category of 3. Then, I combined rankings of 7, 8, 
and 9 into the new category 2. Finally, I combined rankings of 10, 11, and 12 into the new category 
1, which represents the most qualified groups.  
To test the hypotheses related to group and partisan identities, I used standard survey 
questions that asked respondents to provide demographic information about race, sex, and 
partisanship; these constitute basic group membership questions (See Appendix A for descriptive 
statistics and more information about respondents’ demographics). Party identity strength is 
measured using the standard ANES seven-point scale, ranging from Strong Republican to Strong 
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Democrat. The simple group membership questions were combined with identity strength 
measures for racial and gender identity in Study 1. Identity strength was measured by two questions 
that ask “How important is being a [gender group or racial group] to your identity?” and “Do you 
think what happens generally to [racial group or gender group] in this country will have something 
to do with what happens in your life?”  (See Appendix B for a full list of questions in this study).  
RESULTS 
 
General Perceptions of Issue Authority 
 
 Prior to testing the hypotheses, I compare the respondents’ actual rankings of the groups’ 
authority to the assessed competence rankings of the groups. This descriptive overview provides 
an initial sense of both the public’s perceptions and how much group differences shape perceptions 
of issue authority.   From this display, the experiential competence of groups appears to matter as 
much if not more than their stereotypical competence for the public’s assessments of issue 
authority. 
 Table 14 displays the five groups respondents ranked as most qualified to talk about the 
#MeToo Movement, and the measures of assessed competence for reference. In this issue area, the 
measures of perceived authority correspond with the assessed competence ranking for the top three 
groups. Specifically, victims of sexual harassment, working women, and single women are 
perceived as the top three group authorities in this domain; they are ranked in the top quarter by a 
majority of respondents. The disabled and the LGBTQ community round out the top five most 
qualified groups, which is inconsistent with predictions based on the assessed measures of 
competence. The disabled and LGBTQ community do not enjoy high levels of stereotypical 
competence. Still, respondents may regard these groups as particularly qualified to speak about the 
#MeToo Movement because of their unique experiences dealing with sexual harassment and 
 60 
sexual assault—issues central to this social movement. The assessed measure of competence 
weighs stereotypical and experiential competence equally; in this instance, citizens appear to have 
given greater weight to the experiential competence of some groups. (See the Appendix C for a 
full list of rankings of groups for this issue area.) 
Table 14: The Most Qualified Groups to Talk about the #MeToo Movement  
Perceived 
Authority Rank 
Group Name Assessed Competence 
Rank 
Rank in List of Group 
Based on Assessed 
Competence 
1 Victims of Sexual 
Harassment 
 3 Tied 1 
2 Working women  3 Tied 1 
3 Single women  3 Tied 1 
4 Disabled  1 10 
5 LGBTQ 2 Tied 4 
 
 Table 15 displays the public’s perception of the top five groups most qualified to talk about 
immigration. Latinos were perceived as the most qualified, with a clear majority of respondents 
ranking them in the top quarter of groups. Undocumented immigrants emerged as the second most 
qualified group.  Similar to the #MeToo Movement, not all of the groups perceived as most 
authoritative by the public had received high rankings in assessed competence. While Latinos and 
undocumented immigrants received high scores in assessed competence, two of the other three 
groups in the top five—blue collar workers, and the poor—tied for 7th in the rankings on assessed 
competence. Dreamers received the highest score on assessed competence, yet they did not receive 
the highest score on perceived authority, potentially due to respondents’ lack of knowledge about 
the people who comprise this group. Additionally, more highly ranked groups on assessed 
competence like Asians and children were not perceived by the public as having much authority 
on immigration. 
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Group Name Assessed Competence 
Rank 
Rank in List of Group 
Based on Assessed 
Competence 
1 Latinos  2 Tied 2 
2 Undocumented 
immigrants 
 2 Tied 2 
3 Dreamers  3 1 
4 Blue collar 
workers 
 1 Tied 7 
5 The poor 1 Tied 7 
 
Two factors likely contribute to these rankings on immigration. First, these results 
correspond to popular media and social narratives about immigration that center on Latino 
immigrants, when in actuality Asian immigrants comprise a numerical majority of new immigrants 
(Smith, 2018). Once again, these assessments appear to give more importance to experiential 
competence rather than general stereotypes of these groups, as shown by the placement of 
Dreamers, blue collar workers, and the poor in the top five. Broadly, people regard the poor as 
incompetent and cold, yet on immigration, people deem them qualified to speak about it. (See the 
Appendix C for a full list of rankings for immigration.)  
Finally, Table 16 displays the results of respondents’ evaluation of the groups most 
qualified to discuss gun control. Similar to the #MeToo Movement, victims serve as the highest 
ranked group for gun control, suggesting the importance of direct experiences related to an issue 
coupled with stereotypical competence. Veterans serve as the third most qualified group, and this 
ranking again points to the importance of experiential competence. When stereotypical and 
experiential competence were weighted equally in the assessed competence measures, veterans 
were not ranked among the top five groups. Again, it appears that their authority to speak about 
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gun control is due to their direct involvement with this issue area. Mothers and students round out 
the top five groups for this issue area. Respondents may not belong to these groups, but they regard 
mothers and students as issue authorities because of their moving experiences within the context 
of gun policy. (See the Appendix C for a full ranking of groups for the gun control issue area.) 
Table 16: The Most Qualified Groups to Discuss Gun Control 
Perceived 
Authority Rank 
Group Name Assessed Competence 
Rank 
Rank in List of Group 
Based on Assessed 
Competence 
1 Victims of Gun 
Violence 
 3 Tied 1 
2 Gun owners  3 Tied 1 
3 Veterans  2 6 
4 Mothers  3 Tied 1 
5 Students 3 Tied 1 
 
 In the above analysis, assessed competence does, indeed, correspond with the groups 
respondents identified as the most qualified to speak about the #MeToo Movement, immigration, 
and gun control. However, a discrepancy between assessed competence and issue authority exists 
for the remaining groups for each of the three issue areas. These deviations appear to be because 
the measure of assessed competence weighs experiential competence equally with stereotypical 
competence. But, the public seems to weigh experiential competence more heavily when 
considering the groups who hold actual issue authority. 
Variations in Issue Authority 
 
 The previous analysis revealed the groups that a majority of respondents identified as issue 
authorities, but individual factors should produce variation in these perceptions of authority. 
Specifically, group and party identities should shape perceptions of authority because they both 
serve as lenses through which we process information and perceive the political environment 
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(Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Kam, 2005; Goren et al., 2009; Hartman and Weber, 2009; Nicholson, 
2011). Education should also influence the groups people regard as issue authorities because the 
knowledge gained through education influences group stereotypes (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 
1997; Cuddy et al., 1999; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008). 
Education also likely increases media exposure to powerful individual narratives about specific 
issues, making the educated more sensitive to experiential competence (Slater and Rouner, 2002; 
Oliver et al., 2012; Shen, Ahern, and Baker, 2014).  
 These hypotheses were tested using OLS regression analysis. The dependent variables in 
the following analyses are issue authority in the domain, and the independent variables are the 
related group identity, partisan identity, and education level. I also control for race. I limit my 
analysis to the top three groups for the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control issue 
domains, as these groups enjoy high levels of perceived authority from a majority of respondents. 
Additionally, there is enough variation in their selection to allow for individual differences to 
appear. (See Appendix C for a complete summary of models for each of these issue areas.)  
 Table 17 provides a simplified display of the results of the OLS models for the top three 
groups in the #MeToo Movement issue area. Here, I examine group identity in the context of 
gender. Gender identity is a crucial factor in this social movement (Johnson and Hawbaker, 2018). 
As predicted, education significantly influences which groups respondents regard as authorities on 
the #MeToo Movement. As education increases, victims of sexual harassment, working women, 
and single women are more likely to be seen as authorities.  The #MeToo Movement is the newest 
issue area of the three examined, so knowledge of the related political discourse and implications 
surrounding the movement is crucial. Some people may not be aware of the events and policies 
related to this issue and the groups involved with the dialogue surrounding sexual harassment. 
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These results lend support to both portions of the Education Hypothesis, as levels of education 
moderate which groups respondents view as qualified to discuss this issue. Additionally, as 
respondents’ levels of education increase, they are more likely to select the top three groups as 
issue authorities. These three groups all enjoy high levels of experiential competence within the 
realm of the #MeToo Movement and sexual harassment issues. 














































Standard errors in parentheses **indicates significance at p<0.05, * indicates significance at .10 
For Table 17, Male is baseline category for Sex, gender identity strength is scaled from 2-9, with 2 representing 
“Not at all Important” and 9 representing “Extremely Important.” Party identity is scaled from 1-7, with 1 
representing a value of “Strong Republican” and 7 representing “Strong Democrat.” Education is scaled from 1-6, 
with 1 representing “” and 6 representing “Postgraduate education.” 
 
While party identity and gender identity did not explain variation, education does shape 
perceptions of authority for the top three groups in the context of the #MeToo Movement. As 
education level increases, respondents are more likely to rank victims of sexual harassment, 
working women, and single women as the most qualified groups to discuss the #MeToo 
Movement. These results lend support to both portions of the Education Hypothesis, as education 
levels do indeed distinguish respondents’ opinions on groups who have credibility to speak about 
this issue domain. These groups also earned the highest scores on experiential competence out of 
GROUP  
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all groups examined in this context. Respondents with higher education levels likely possess 
knowledge of this new issue and may have been exposed to emotional narratives surrounding the 
issue of sexual harassment.  
Table 18 provides a condensed display of the OLS regression models for immigration. In 
this context, I operationalize group identity by measuring both racial and gender identities. 
Policies in favor of increased restrictions placed on immigration as well as policies related to 
relaxing these restrictions both center around race (Farris and Mohamed, 2018). Additionally, the 
prototypical image of an immigrant in the United States context is a Latino male, which suggests 
gender serves as an important group to examine in this context (Farris and Mohamed, 2018). 
Again, I focus on differences in perceptions of authority, not on the strength of those differences. 














































































Standard errors in parentheses * indicates significance at p<0.05  
Male is baseline category for Sex, gender identity strength is scaled from 2-9, with 2 representing “Not at all 
Important” and 9 representing “Extremely Important.” 
White is the baseline category for Race, and Racial identity strength is coded from 2-9, with two representing “Not 
at all important,” and 9 representing “Extremely important.” See Table 7 for explanation on how other independent 
variables were coded. 
 
Unlike the #MeToo Movement, party identity is the most consistent factor shaping issue 
authority on immigration. Strong Democratic identifiers are most likely to rank Latinos, 
undocumented immigrants, and Dreamers as the group most qualified to discuss immigration. 
These results correspond with elite discourse surrounding the media coverage related to the 
particular immigrants entering the country, their deservingness, and their legal status (Yoo, 2008; 
Peterson, Slothuus, Stubager, and Togeby, 2010; Merolla, Ramakrishan, and Haynes, 2013; 
Holmes and Castaneda, 2016).  While these groups enjoy high levels of experiential competence, 
these results suggest that partisan bias shapes experiential competence.  
GROUP  
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Immigration has occupied a prominent place on the political agenda and in the news for 
considerably longer than the #MeToo Movement. This might help explain why education is not a 
primary driver of individual differences in perceptions of authority for immigration. Still, 
education does significantly affect perceptions of Dreamers’ issue authority: as education 
increases, people are more likely to rank Dreamers as the most qualified group to discuss 
immigration. Understanding who is a “Dreamer” may be associated with education, given this is 
a relatively new social group. Additionally, respondents with higher education levels may 
sympathize with Dreamers because this group is comprised of highly educated immigrants who 
are shielded from deportation in order to remain in college (Walters, 2017). Exposure to narratives 
from Dreamers may elicit additional sympathy, which again points to the importance of 
experiential competence among educated respondents. 
While party identity plays the most important role in explaining variation in perceptions of 
authority for immigration, group identities are also responsible for shaping opinions on the top 
three groups in this issue area. Racial identity strength does influence the issue authority of Latinos, 
perceived as the most qualified group to discuss immigration. As racial identity strength increases 
generally, the issue authority of Latinos decreases. Additionally, gender identity moderates 
whether or not respondents deem Latinos as the most qualified group to discuss immigration. 
Figure 1 displays the marginal effects plot for the interaction between sex and gender identity 
strength for the predicted values of Latinos. The perceived authority of Latinos decreases starkly 
for males as their gender identity strength increases. The baseline race in this model is White, so 
this trend is occurring for white males, specifically. This is in keeping with the media framing of 
immigration which has activated whites’ racial identity by emphasizing the threat of increased 
diversity and a nationwide demographic shift to the white majority in the United States (Jardina, 
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2019). Relatedly, Latino men function as the most prominent image of immigrants in the media 
(Harris and Mohamed, 2018). 
Figure 1: Predicted Perception of Latino Authority by Sex and Gender Identity Strength   
 
In this figure, 1 represents male, and 2 represents female 
 
 Racial identity also produces variation in perceptions of authority among Latino 
respondents for undocumented immigrants. Figure 2 displays the marginal effects plot for the 
interaction between race and racial identity strength for Latinos. As racial identity strength 
increases among Latinos, they are more likely to deem undocumented immigrants as the most 
qualified group to speak about immigration. Despite negative framing of undocumented 
immigrants in the media, Latinos with strong racial identities regard this group as qualified to 
speak on immigration. Perhaps because this image often involves an undocumented immigrant of 
Latino ethnicity, Latinos are likely using their racial lens to evaluate this context, which 



























 Racial identity influences variation in perceptions of authority of Dreamers among Black 
respondents. As racial identity strength increases among blacks, they are more likely to rank 
Dreamers as the most qualified group to discuss immigration. Perhaps compared to the baseline 
White racial group, blacks are more likely to deem this group qualified because they sympathize 
with minority concerns. Additionally, blacks comprise a core group that forms the base of the 
Democratic Party, so they may be using their party identity when responding to the question 






































Figure 3: Blacks’ Perception of Dreamers’ Authority by Racial Identity Strength 
 
 
 Finally, Table 19 displays a condensed version of the results from the OLS models 
predicting issue authority for gun control. As in the #MeToo Movement issue area, I evaluate the 
Group Identity Hypothesis by operationalizing group identity as gender identity. Gender identity 
is central to this issue domain because mothers have been at the forefront of the gun control 
discussion since the turn of the 21st century (Goss and Heaney, 2010). (See the Appendix C for the 
full results from these models.)  
 Much like immigration, discourse on gun rights has existed throughout the country’s 
history. Party identity again plays a prominent role in shaping perceptions of issue authority. The 
stronger the Democratic identification, the more respondents are likely to perceive victims of gun 
violence as the most qualified group to discuss gun control. In contrast, the stronger the Republican 
identification the more likely people are to rank gun owners and veterans as authorities on gun 
control. Unlike immigration, party identity produces variation among the top three most qualified 
groups to discuss gun control. Republicans may be more likely to select gun owners and veterans 
 71 
in this context due to the framing of gun control in their preferred media sources. Additionally, 
these groups may also serve as a natural constituency of the Republican Party.  
 While party identity best predicts issue authority for gun control, education does influence 
if victims of gun violence are perceived as qualified to speak about this issue. As education 
increases, respondents are more likely to perceive victims as the most qualified to speak about gun 
control. The myriad mass shootings that have occurred in schools may have contributed to this 
recognition of authority. Education may also provide respondents with a deeper understanding of 
the gun control issue area and instances of gun violence. These results again point to the 
importance of experiential competence, as respondents with higher education levels give credence 
to the experiences of victims in this issue area. 










































Standard errors in parentheses * indicates significance at p<0.05 
For Table 19, Male is baseline category for Sex, gender identity strength is scaled from 2-9, with 2 representing 
“Not at all Important” and 9 representing “Extremely Important.” Party identity is scaled from 1-7, with 1 
representing a value of “Strong Republican” and 7 representing “Strong Democrat.” Education is scaled from 1-6, 
with 1 representing “No High School” and 6 representing “Postgraduate education.” 
 
 Overall, the results on these three issues demonstrate that individual variation in 
perceptions of issue authority exists. Based on our own life experiences, we regard different groups 
as more or less qualified to discuss the #MeToo Movement, immigration and gun control.  Party 
GROUP  
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identity, group identity, and education all shape the groups people regard as authorities on these 
issues. 
 These findings also suggest that general group stereotypes do not necessarily translate into 
issue authority. For example, both Whites and the poor appeared as options across all three issue 
areas. Table 20 displays the average authority ranking of both groups across issue areas. Higher 
rankings indicate a higher score on issue authority. Whites score higher on stereotypical 
competence, as they are high on both warmth and competence dimensions (Cuddy et al., 1999). 
But, these overall positive stereotypes only translate into greater issue authority for gun control. 
Respondents deem the poor as more qualified than whites to speak about both the #MeToo 
Movement and immigration, despite their more negative general stereotype. Thus, critically, these 
analyses demonstrate that a group’s experiential relationship to an issue matter as much, if not 
more, than as its overall societal stereotype in determining issue authority. 
















































Issue authority is context-specific, and the results of this study demonstrate that victims of 
sexual harassment, Latinos, and victims of gun violence are perceived as authorities on the 
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#MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control issue domains, respectively. Although the 
public sees these three groups as issue authorities, variation in perceptions of authority exist. Who 
we are and which groups we belong to—whether they are racial or gender groups—shape our 
perceptions of issue authority. Thus, the results offer support for the Group Identity Hypothesis, 
as respondents accorded issue authority based on their own group identities.  
The findings also support the Party Identity Hypothesis, as Democrats and Republicans 
vary in their perceptions of issue authority. Indeed, party elites regularly encourage partisan 
perceptions of issue authority. For example, the Democrats’ invited guests to President Trump’s 
State of the Union Address in 2019 included undocumented immigrants, and victims of both sexual 
harassment and gun violence. These are the very groups that my analysis demonstrates 
Democrats—significantly more than Republicans—perceive as the most qualified authorities in 
their respective issue areas. But such clear partisan endorsement of these groups’ issue authority 
might make it more difficult for them to bridge the partisan divide when they advocate for policies 
related to these topics.  
The results also support the Education Hypothesis.  This suggests that groups with 
experiential competence that aspire to exercise issue authority may face barriers when members 
of the public are unaware of their qualifications to speak about an issue. Education levels moderate 
the groups individuals regard as the most qualified to speak about these issues. In the context of 
the #MeToo Movement, especially, education is a crucial predictor of the groups people perceive 
as authorities. The newest issue of the three, the #MeToo Movement has not occupied a space on 
the pollical agenda for a considerable amount of time, so people may not be aware of the social 
groups connected to the issue. 
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Perhaps most importantly, this research shows that we should broaden our focus beyond 
general stereotypes when we explore how social groups behave in a political environment. While 
general group stereotypes do influence a group’s ability to speak with authority on an issue, a 
group’s unique experiences in an issue area seem to matter more when the public evaluates its 
authority. Separating stereotypical competence from experiential competence not only provides a 
more nuanced understanding of issue authority itself, but it also contributes to our appreciation of 
these groups as they participate in politics. Society may regard a group as “cold” and 
“incompetent,” generally, yet this perception does not necessarily preclude the group from 
delivering powerful, convincing political messages.   
 Indeed, the analysis supports the first portion of the Education Hypothesis as well as the 
second portion highlighting the value of a group’s unique relationship with an issue. Respondents 
with higher education levels give greater credence to experiential competence than stereotypical 
competence. Victims, the poor, and Dreamers can speak with authority on issues that directly affect 
them. When we learn about these groups’ experiences through narratives, we listen to them when 
they speak. Being a “victim” serves as an especially important kind of experience that appears to 
provide groups with qualifications to speak about an issue area that has harmed them.  
 A few important limitations of this study exist and should be explored in future research. 
First, while this study identifies the groups a majority of people perceive as issue authorities and 
the individual factors that shape their understanding of authority, it does not provide a 
comprehensive overview of these three issue areas. Because I presented respondents with a set list 
of groups, they may not have been able to identify the true groups they perceive as the most 
qualified to speak about these concerns. However, the inclusion of groups that overlapped across 
the three domains provided an opportunity to compare issue authority across contexts. Exploring 
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authority across these issues is critical because the public may regard the same group as 
particularly qualified to talk about one issue but lacking the experience and general competence to 
possess expertise on another. Additionally, including a concise list of groups that represent all 
combinations of general group stereotypes was essential in order to evaluate separately the role of 
stereotypical competence and experiential competence in shaping a groups’ issue authority.  
Second, the three issues I explore do not represent a comprehensive overview of salient 
issues in American politics. However, these issues possess similarities and differences that 
combine to form ideal initial areas of exploration of issue authority. Comparing a newer issue like 
the #MeToo Movement to older issues like immigration and gun control allowed me to understand 
how time shapes variations in issue authority based on group and partisan identities.  In the future, 
I plan to study more issues and include more groups in order to build upon the findings in this 
study. I also plan to evaluate how other salient group identities like religious identities may 
influence perceptions of issue authority.  
These results confirm that issue authority is context-specific. Groups that have expertise 
on one topic may not even possess any information about another. Additionally, even when groups 
are deemed authorities by a majority of the public, variation in perceptions of authority exist. These 
differences suggest that while groups can overcome the effects of harmful general stereotypes if 
they are competent on an issue, they may not be able to convince everyone they are credible 
sources of information on a topic. Understanding which groups function as issue authorities is 
crucial prior to evaluating the consequences of this psychological construct, namely whether issue 
authority does indeed function as an expert source cue that is more persuasive than an identity-
based cue (Wiener and Mowen, 1996). The variation in perceptions of authority signal that issue 
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authority may not serve as a convincing source to all members of the public. I rely on the issue 




















































In the wake of multiple school shootings, the House of Representatives held a hearing on gun 
violence in February 2019. As the first hearing on this topic in eight years, the event garnered an 
impressive amount of attention from the media and members of the public. Rife with emotions, 
the people who testified offered compelling arguments both in favor and against proposals to 
strengthen regulations on guns to prevent further tragedies. Students who survived the Parkland 
mass shooting passionately advocated for passage of universal background checks. A witness who 
was raped in college voiced her remorse that she did not have a gun with her, as she believed it 
would have helped her prevent the attack (Diep, 2019).  
 Prior to this eventful hearing, the news media ran stories containing personal narratives 
from people on both sides of the gun debate, as repeated school shootings increased the salience 
of this issue in the minds of the public. David Joy offered The New York Times magazine a telling 
account of the integral role gun culture played in his rural Appalachian upbringing (Joy, 2018). 
Nelba Marquez-Greene submitted a harrowing letter to Education Week, addressing school 
teachers on the brink of the new academic term following the Sandy Hook Elementary School 
shooting. After losing her six-year-old daughter in the attack, she praised the teachers for their 
unwavering support of the surviving students and hoped they would continue to display a 
remarkable sense of courage (Marquez-Greene, 2013).  
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 Victims of gun violence, rape survivors, rural residents, and mothers have supplied the 
public with powerful testimonies in favor of preventing further instances of violence via both 
stricter and looser regulations of guns. These cases highlight that social groups often offer solutions 
to important political topics based on their unique experiences with these issues. While political 
scientists have explored how social groups can shape public opinion on an issue, they have not 
analyzed thoroughly how a group’s expertise on a particular topic may provide them with the 
ability to convince the public more effectively than another group that does not possess relevant 
experiences. I argue that social groups can possess issue authority: the ability to speak powerfully 
on an issue, and this issue authority can allow groups to deliver persuasive source cues. 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that issue-authority is context-specific by 
identifying which social groups the public perceives as most qualified to speak in three separate 
issue domains: the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control. In this chapter, I evaluate 
the effects of possessing issue authority in these same issue areas. Specifically, I consider whether 
issue authority translates into effective expert source cues. By comparing groups with issue 
authority with those that lack the same levels of issue authority, I establish whether groups with 
authority serve as more credible sources of information. The results of this study show that issue 
authority allows social groups to serve as expert sources of information; however, variation in 
perceptions of authority prevent these groups from delivering credible source cues in all issue 
areas.  
THE COMPONENTS OF SOCIAL GROUP ISSUE AUTHORITY 
 People often conceive of political issues based on their connections to social groups. 
Pervasive societal group stereotypes and groups’ unique relationships to issues influence how 
citizens make sense of new issues in their political environments (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; 
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Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; Cuddy et al., 1999). The public regards groups that have issue 
authority as qualified sources of information on a particular topic. Importantly, issue authority 
fluctuates across contexts because it is domain specific. Thus, some groups may serve as issue 
authorities on a host of political topics, while other groups may not garner the qualifications 
necessary to speak about any issue area. Thus, issue authority should enhance our understanding 
of the types of source cues that influence how the public processes incoming political information.  
Issue authority exists on two dimensions: association and competence (Walgrave, Levere, 
and Tresch, 2012). First, people form associations between social groups and political issues. 
Understanding these relationships is critical, as the psychological process of connecting groups 
and issues occurs prior to assessing the groups’ competence. Groups with competence serve as 
effective political actors in an issue area. Perceived competence is a crucial determinant of issue 
authority, and I offer an original contribution to advance our understanding of group competence, 
as I assert that two types of competence exist.   
 Both stereotypical competence and experiential competence comprise the second 
dimension of social group issue authority. A wealth of literature in social psychology explains 
that most social groups possess general stereotypes that fall along two dimensions: warmth and 
competence (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2008; Brambilla, 
Hewstone, and Colucci, 2013).  Groups the public considers friendly and likeable enjoy positive 
stereotypes on the warmth dimension, while groups that are perceived to be intelligent and 
responsible receive positive stereotypes on the competence dimension (Brambilla et al., 2013; 
Cuddy et al., 2008). Cultural reputations, socialization, and media framing can shape these 
general stereotypes (Hyman, 1959; Tajfel, 1981; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, 
and Glick, 2008; Mastro, 2009; Brambilla, Hewstone, and Colucci, 2013).  Stereotypical 
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competence can affect issue authority, as people may be more likely to perceive groups with 
generally positive stereotypes as qualified to speak about certain issues than groups with overall 
negative stereotypes.   
EXPERIENTIAL COMPETENCE 
 In my initial examination of issue authority, I weighted the two types of competence, 
experiential and stereotypical, equally when predicting the groups individuals would rank as most 
qualified to speak about three issues: the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control.  The 
results from this study revealed that groups with experiential competence were more likely to serve 
as issue authorities than groups with lower stakes in these three issue areas. While broad group 
stereotypes do shape issue authority, they do not preclude groups with overall negative reputations 
from speaking powerfully about an issue. Perhaps the most compelling finding from this study 
was that the public may perceive groups like the poor as more qualified to speak about an issue 
like immigration than another positively stereotyped group. Thus, experiential competence appears 
to translate directly into issue authority. 
 Although stereotypes help us make sense of our surroundings, when we learn about group 
activity beyond their general reputations, we may use group experiences to process our complex 
political world. Earlier, I found that education moderates social group issue authority, as 
individuals with higher education levels selected different groups as more qualified to speak about 
each of the three issue areas. Specifically, these educated citizens deemed groups with experiential 
competence as more qualified than participants with lower education levels. Education supplies 
individuals with the cognitive resources necessary to comprehend the complexity of the issue 
areas, but more importantly, it exposes them to group activity within each of these domains. 
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 Narratives serve as the likely means through which the public learns about the experiential 
competence of different groups in specific contexts. When members of the public possess the 
cognitive resources necessary to make sense of their political surroundings, they may tune in to 
the news on television, read about politics online or in a magazine, listen to political podcasts, or 
consult social media for updates on salient issues of the day. These media outlets often contain 
excerpts from members of groups who deliver powerful accounts of their firsthand involvement 
with a certain political topic. Personal stories elicit emotional responses from the public more 
effectively than impersonal messages (Slater and Rouner, 2002; Shen, Ahern, and Baker, 2014). 
Oliver et al., (2002) explain that narratives specifically inspire an audience to develop feelings of 
sympathy and compassion, which are critical for stigmatized groups that also may suffer from 
negative stereotypes involving both warmth and competence.  
 In addition to evoking feelings, captivating narratives may develop simultaneously a 
recognition of the intricacies involved in an issue area; this should allow groups with issue 
authority to produce similarly powerful source cues. Members of groups possess a deeper 
awareness of issues on which they have authority. Consequently, people who do not belong to the 
group cannot possibly understand these details in the same way because they lack firsthand 
involvement. For example, middle class families express discontent with the dialogue surrounding 
student loans, when they argue that wealthy elites should not discuss this issue because they do 
not understand the anxiety produced by increasing student debt (Kim and Thottam, 2019). Hence, 
groups with authority may possess credibility as a function of their expertise, and, crucially, when 




ISSUE AUTHORITY AS A SOURCE CUE  
Research on source cues has established that credibility plays a central role in separating 
influential sources from ineffective ones (Kelman and Hovland, 1953; Chaiken, 1980, Petty et al, 
1981). In turn, Wiener and Mowen (1986) argue that credibility is composed of three components: 
attractiveness, trustworthiness, and expertise. Individuals perceive elites as expert sources when 
they possess these characteristics (Chaiken, 1980; Weiner and Mowen, 1986). If elites appear 
friendly, likeable, and warm, then individuals are more likely to view them as attractive, and this 
attractiveness then translates into credibility (Chaiken, 1980). Social Identity Theory explains that 
individuals are more likely to trust members of their ingroup (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Thus, 
individuals are more likely to perceive elites as credible sources when the elites are members of 
their salient social groups. Finally, when elites develop a nuanced understanding of the issue at 
hand and appear intelligent and competent, they possess expertise, which can also contribute to 
their credibility (Chaiken, 1980; Weiner and Mowen, 1986).  
Often, groups may not score highly on all three characteristics of credible sources. 
Specifically, some messages may only provide identity-based cues because they come from fellow 
ingroup members. Political scientists have explored how group identities affect how individuals 
process information. When a particular identity is salient, individuals use their group attachments 
to navigate an unfamiliar environment (Conover; 1984; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Brewer, 1991). 
Additionally, individuals abandon their personal emotions in favor of group emotions, so they 
perceive their surroundings in terms of “us vs. them.” In politics, for example, citizens often give 
deference to sources with whom they share a partisan identity (see Bullock 2011; Slothuus 2016). 
When partisanship is absent from a political context, people may follow other identity-based cues 
like gender and racial cues (McDermott, 1998). Identities inspire people to view their ingroups as 
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more trustworthy and attractive than outgroups, so identity-based cues can help individuals with 
salient identities make sense of information about new political issues (Wiener and Mowen, 1986). 
Critically, these types of cues only persuade the group members whose identities are salient.  
However, Wiener and Mowen (1986) assert that individuals evaluate expert source cues 
more objectively than identity-based cues. Essentially, people defer to groups who have 
established a connection to a specific concern, even if they themselves do not belong to this group. 
Lupia and McCubbins (1998) also provide relevant insights related to group cues in the context of 
representation and the relationships between the mass public and political institutions. They, too, 
argue that belonging to a group does not preclude a person from viewing another group as more 
capable of delivering persuasive messages about an issue.   
I argue that issue authorities can deliver expert source cues. Their credibility on an issue 
primarily comes from their expertise, which, according to previous research, is derived from 
experiential competence.  Importantly, source credibility and issue authority both fluctuate across 
contexts, so certain groups may be more credible information providers than others in the contexts 
of particular political issues. When social groups provide information about issues on which they 
have authority, they make their unique experiences with an issue salient by demonstrating 
expertise about a certain aspect of an issue. Thus, groups with issue authority can provide an expert 
source cue for individuals in these contexts, so groups with authority on the immigration, the 
#MeToo Movement, and gun control should be able to persuade the public when they are speaking 
about these issues. Based on previous research, I expect Latinos, victims of sexual harassment, 
and victims of gun violence to deliver expert source cues on their respective issue areas.  
Because the Latino community and immigration policy discussions are inextricably linked, 
Latinos have garnered a wealth of experience surrounding the issue (Farris and Mohamed, 2018; 
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Smith, 2018). President Trump’s strict immigration agenda has inspired officials in the Department 
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to conduct raids intended to crackdown on illegal entry 
into the country. Though the authorization status of Latino immigrants varies on an individual-
level basis, Latino community members have increased their knowledge of the raids in order to 
raise awareness of the topic (Brinkmann and Castellanos, 2019). Additionally, Spanish-language 
news shows cover immigration in a more positive light (Abrajano and Signh, 2009); consequently, 
Latino viewers are likely to develop a broader understanding of the intricacies involved in 
immigration policies. Ranking Latinos as the most qualified group to discuss immigration may 
motivate the public to also recognize their expertise in this complicated issue domain and thus 
regard Latinos’ messages on immigration as expert source cues. 
Previously, I established that victimhood enhances perceptions of issue authority by 
producing expertise. Both victims of gun violence and victims of sexual harassment serve as issue 
authorities in the context of gun control and the #MeToo Movement, respectively.3 The recent 
string of mass shootings that have occurred in schools, places of worship, and popular nighttime 
hangouts have inspired survivors of these events to deliver painful accounts of their experiences 
to signify the imminent need to address gun policies in the United States (Alter, 2017; Diep, 2019). 
Individual narratives contribute to the expertise of survivors of the tragedies who speak about their 
emotions and reactions to the crises as well as the lasting effects on their lives following instances 
of gun violence.  
Similarly, victims of sexual harassment can deliver firsthand accounts of their traumatic 
experiences to weave emotional narratives that tug at the heartstrings of the public in ways more 
 
3 See Chapter Three 
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impersonal reports about instances of this issue fail to accomplish. Though sexual harassment as 
an issue predates the formation of the #MeToo Movement, this new focus on this issue has shed 
light on its pervasiveness in society, especially in professional settings (Jacobs, 2018; Johnson and 
Hawbaker, 2018). The sheer volume of tweets and social media posts containing the hashtag 
#MeToo along with graphic accounts from victims convey their unfortunate experience with this 
issue (Johnson and Hawbaker, 2018). After many prominent actresses revealed their interactions 
with popular producer Harvey Weinstein’s constituted sexual harassment, the board of the 
Weinstein Company fired him (Kantor and Twohey, 2017).  Victimhood in this issue area provides 
issue authority that should allow these individuals to deliver powerful expert source cues. 
In my analysis, I examine different types of expert source cues. I argue that issue authority 
provides groups with expertise that can translate into source credibility, but other sources may be 
able to possess source credibility as well because of their attractiveness and trustworthiness. For 
example, I compare victims of sexual harassment with Hollywood actresses in the context of the 
#MeToo Movement. Actresses may also qualify as “experts” in the minds of the public because 
they are deemed attractive, and research shows attractive people are also perceived as trustworthy 
(Horai, Naccari, and Fatoullah, 1974; Todorov, Pakrashi, and Oosterof, 2009; Waismel-Manor and 
Tsfati, 2011). 
I evaluate whether variations in strength of issue authority influence the credibility of social 
groups when they speak about political issues. Specifically, I posit: 
The Issue Authority Hypothesis: The public will perceive groups with high levels of issue 
authority as more credible sources of information than groups that possess low levels of issue 
authority in specific issue areas.  
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 Because the public deems certain groups as the most qualified to speak about specific 
issues, they perceive them as authorities who deliver persuasive messages concerning these topics. 
I posit that among source cues that are not identity-based cues, groups that are “expert sources” 
vary in their levels of expertise, trustworthiness, and attractiveness. I evaluate this hypothesis by 
pitting sources with issue authority (Latinos, victims of sexual harassment, and victims of gun 
violence) who have expertise on these topics due to their high levels of experiential competence 
against sources without issue authority.  
THE TRESHOLD OF EXPERTISE 
Individuals rely on source cues to evaluate information about the #MeToo Movement, 
immigration, and gun control without actually analyzing the content of this information. However, 
some sources are stronger than others, and the strength of the source cue influences whether or not 
it serves as a helpful information shortcut (Druckman, 2001). When individuals engage in heuristic 
processing, they are less likely to use an elite source cue as a shortcut without first determining if 
the source is credible (Kelman and Hovland, 1953; Chaiken, 1980). If social groups have 
experiential competence on issues on which they have authority, then individuals who are not 
motivated to arrive at accurate conclusions about these topics should follow these expert source 
cues in order to make sense of these political environments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 
Chaiken, 1980; Petty et al., 1981; Kunda, 1990; Ratneshwar and Chaiken, 1991; Mondak, 1993; 
Chen and Chaiken, 1999; Evans, 2008). 
But, the superiority of expert cues should only hold to a certain point. While Wiener and 
Mowen (1986) find that expert cues are more helpful than identity cues, they do not explore 
whether this effect holds for individuals with strong identities. Similarly, Lupia and McCubbins 
(1998) contend that certain groups will not always deliver messages that persuade members of 
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their own groups, yet they do not distinguish between group membership and salient group 
identities. Individuals with especially strong identities are unlikely to defer to issue authorities who 
belong outside of their ingroups, regardless of the discursive context. Their commitment to their 
ingroups suggests that their identity will remain salient in political contexts. 
Partisanship as an Identity-Based Cue 
Research concerning issue framing and motivated reasoning has focused primarily on the 
influence of partisan source cues, suggesting that these cues may moderate how individuals 
evaluate new political information about the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control 
(Kunda, 1990; Druckman, 2001; Kam, 2005; Goren et al., 2009; Hartman and Weber, 2009; 
Nicholson, 2011). Indeed, in my earlier study of issue authority, party identity moderates 
perceptions of issue authority in the contexts of immigration and gun control. As Democratic 
identity strength increases, individuals are more likely to rank Latinos as the most qualified group 
to discuss immigration, while the opposite trend is true as Republican identity strength increases. 
Additionally, as Republican identity strength increases, individuals are less likely to perceive 
victims of gun violence as issue authorities in the context of gun control. 
Partisans are more likely to perceive members of their own political party as credible 
sources than members of the opposing party (Kam, 2005; Goren et al., 2009; Hartman and Weber; 
2009; Nicholson, 2011), largely because of the effects of partisan identities which influence people 
to perceive political contexts in “us vs. them” terms (Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Green, 1999). 
Individuals view messages from their copartisans as credible because they are more likely to trust 
members of their ingroup and find them more attractive. Conversely, individuals regard members 
of the opposing party as the out-group, so they are less likely to rate them as trustworthy and 
attractive. The presence of two of the three components of credibility among copartisans indicates 
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that ingroup party cues will provide useful shortcuts and identity-based cues. Critically, the 
absence of these factors among members of the opposition party actually produces a stronger 
influence, as out-group cues exert an even greater impact on opinion (Goren et al., 2009).  
My focus is on social groups instead of political parties, so pitting issue authority cues 
against explicit partisan cues is outside the scope of this research. However, party identities are 
chronically salient in a political context, so strong partisans should still use their group identities 
as lenses to process information about each of these three issue areas. Furthermore, distinct sets of 
social groups comprise each of the two major parties, so implicit party cues may also be accessible 
to strong partisans (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002). For example, if Latinos were 
advocating for a particular policy related to immigration, strong Republicans may assume this 
policy is more in-line with the Democratic Party platform, as a majority of Latinos themselves 
(~62%) support the Democratic Party (Lopez, Barrera, and Krogstad, 2018). 
I argue that sources with expertise on the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun 
control may not deliver credible source cues to all members of groups that do not perceive them 
as trustworthy and attractive. Specifically, these expert source cues may fail to persuade people 
with strong party identities. Because party identity influences the perceived authority of Latinos 
and victims of gun violence in the contexts of immigration and gun control, respectively, I posit 
the following hypothesis: 
The Partisan Threshold Hypothesis:  
a. As Republican identity strength increases, people will be less likely to perceive Latinos 
as credible sources of information in the context of immigration. 
b. As Republican identity strength increases, people will be less likely to perceive victims of 
gun violence as credible sources of information in the context of gun control. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
 I examine the effects of social group issue authority in three issue domains: the #MeToo 
Movement, immigration, and gun control using an original survey experiment created using 
Qualtrics, an online survey software company. The survey, a 2x2 design, was distributed in the 
spring of 2019 to a student sample (N=168) at a large public research university in the South. 
Students enrolled in Introduction to American Government were invited to participate in the study 
in order to fulfill the subject pool research requirement of the course. Students were recruited via 
email and had two weeks to complete the study.  
 In this analysis, I assess the implications of social group issue authority on the perceptions 
of source cues.  The key dependent variable is the source credibility of the social groups perceived 
as most qualified to discuss each of the three issues. I operationalize source credibility by asking 
respondents to assess directly how credible certain groups are when they are discussing various 
public policies. Previous research is the basis for my determination of group issue authority in this 
study. Specifically, in my earlier research (Sentementes, 2019), I found that victims of sexual 
harassment, Latinos, and victims of gun violence serve as issue authorities in the contexts of the 
#MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control, respectively. I compare these groups to others 
that scored lower in perceived authority to determine whether issue authority produces expert 
source cues that enables certain groups to speak with credibility.  
 This survey contained fictional vignettes about each of the three issue areas. Respondents 
were presented information about policies pertaining to each of the three issues. Critically, they 
were randomly assigned a source of information that delivered details about a policy proposal 
designed to address conditions related to the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control. I 
designed these fictional policy proposals based on public opinion data that demonstrates these 
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issue positions do not necessarily divide the public along partisan lines (Pew Research Center, 
2018; Bialik, 2019). Importantly, I anticipated that the student sample would identify more 
frequently with the Democratic Party, so I selected policies that especially appeal to Republicans 
in order to present a more conservative test of the effects of issue authority. I pretested this survey 
prior to fielding to assess whether these policies elicited disparate opinions from respondents (See 
Appendix C for information about the pretest).  
 The portion of the experiment concerning the #MeToo Movement centered around the 
issue of pervasiveness of sexual harassment. Respondents read a short account that detailed,  
“At a Congressional hearing last week, TREATMENT GROUP testified that they are 
outraged by how widespread sexual harassment is in American society. They want 
Congress to make this issue a priority on its agenda, as the #MeToo Movement has made 
clear the need for bipartisan action on sexual harassment.”  
 
Half of respondents received this statement with the issue authority cue: their story mentioned that 
victims of sexual harassment testified at this hearing. The other half of respondents learned that a 
group of Hollywood actresses came forward to advocate for this policy. In my earlier study, 
celebrities were ranked eleventh out of twelve groups in terms of their qualification to speak about 
the #MeToo Movement. However, I expect the analysis in the context of the #MeToo Movement 
to be the hardest test of my theory because I have pitted victims of sexual harassment who have 
issue authority on sexual harassment, which produces expertise, against a group of Hollywood 
actresses, whom the public deems attractive and trustworthy, the other two characteristics that 
comprise source credibility along with expertise. 
 In the second portion of the experiment, respondents read a similar fictional scenario 
centered on a Senatorial hearing about immigration policy. Participants read a vignette that stated:  
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“A group of [TREATMENT GROUP ] testified at a Senate hearing about immigration last 
week. They are new citizens who talked about successfully completing an English language 
program. They testified that all immigrants should learn English because it helps them 
more easily join American society.” 
 
Once again, half of respondents read about the group most qualified to speak about immigration: 
a Latino source. For the second half, the vignette described the group testifying as Muslims, a 
group ranked as ninth in terms of their qualifications to speak about immigration. 
 Finally, respondents in the study received a third and final vignette conveying highlights 
from a recent public hearing about gun control. This fictional account explains: 
 “[TREATMENT GROUP] came forward to testify at a public hearing last week. They 
are outraged by the pervasiveness of gun violence in American society. They want 
Congress to allow concealed carry in more places to prevent more gun violence.”  
 
Half of respondents learned about this information from victims of gun violence, while the other 
half received the policy proposal from a group of poor people. In my previous research, a majority 
of the public ranked the poor as the tenth most qualified group to discuss gun control.  
 To test the first hypothesis related to the ability of issue authority to produce expert source 
cues, a series of t-tests were conducted to compare the effects of the explicit source cues present 
in each of the three conditions. For the #MeToo Movement, I compared responses to the question 
that asks respondents, “How credible do you find [victims of sexual harassment/a group of 
Hollywood actresses] when they advocate for bipartisan action on sexual harassment?” In the 
context of immigration, “How credible do you find [Latinos/Muslims] when they advocate for 
English language programs on behalf of immigrants?” Finally, in the context of gun control, I 
compare responses to the question “How credible do you find [victims of gun violence/poor people 
when they advocate for bipartisan action on concealed carry?” Results from these t-tests will 
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display whether or not respondents deem issue authorities as more credible sources of information 
than groups who are not perceived generally as the most qualified to discuss these issues. 
 In order to test the Partisan Threshold Hypothesis, I move beyond simple comparisons and 
evaluate party identity shape the ability of issue authorities to serve as credible sources of 
information. A series of OLS regression models were used to assess how individual factors 
including party identity strength influence perceptions of source credibility in tandem with the 
experimental condition. The dependent variable, perceptions of source credibility, is an ordered 
variable with four categories, and the categories are evenly spaced. Because I do not think the 
movement from category to category differs theoretically, I treated this variable as continuous and 
used OLS for ease of interpretation.  
I used standard survey questions that asked respondents to provide demographic 
information about race, sex, education, and party identity strength; these constitute basic group 
membership questions (See Appendix A for descriptive statistics and more information about 
respondents’ demographics). Party identity strength is measured using the standard ANES seven-
point scale, ranging from Strong Republican to Strong Democrat. Results from these models will 
demonstrate whether or not a threshold to expertise exist. Partisan differences that remove the 
effects of the treatment should signify that the expert source cues do not effectively persuade strong 
Republicans to view the issue authorities as credible on immigration and gun control.  
RESULTS 
Issue Authority Cues in the Context of the #MeToo Movement 
 Prior to evaluating whether or not issue authority produces expert source cues for strong 
partisans, I assess if issue authority even translates into an expert source cue. First, I compare 
respondents’ reactions to the vignettes featuring two distinct groups who advocate for an increase 
 93 
in government attention to the problem of sexual harassment that pervades many facets of our 
society. The results from this examination reveal that respondents do indeed vary in their 
perceptions of credibility when learning information about this policy from disparate sources. 
 Table 21 displays the results from the t-test that compares responses to the survey 
question about the credibility of both sources in the context of the #MeToo Movement. Response 
options to the survey question involving source credibility ranged from 1-4, where 1 represents 
the most credible, and 4 represents the least credible. Participants who received the version of the 
story where a group of Hollywood actresses delivered the information had a higher mean value, 
which translates into lower perceived credibility than respondents who were assigned the version 
where victims of sexual harassment delivered the message. The difference of means is 
statistically significant, which demonstrates that people do perceive issue authorities as more 
credible sources of information in this issue area. These preliminary results offer support for the 
Issue Authority Hypothesis. 
Table 21: Comparing Source Cues for the #MeToo Movement 











**indicates significance at p < 0.05 
 
 Thus, victims of sexual harassment are, indeed, seen as possessing a deeper understanding 
of the issue of sexual harassment. Their unfortunate experience produces expertise in this issue 
area, as people perceive them as more credible sources of information when offering policy 
proposals to address this problem. However, comparing the conditions of the experimental 
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treatment only offers a partial picture of the factors that influence perceptions of source credibility. 
Though people may deem victims of sexual harassment as credible sources of information, an 
additional analysis of the influence of individual characteristics should reveal the durability of 
these effects.  
 Specifically, an examination of the effects of partisan identity strength will provide a more 
complete picture of the effects of issue authority and allow me to test the Partisan Threshold 
Hypothesis. Table 22 displays the results of an OLS regression model where the dependent 
variable is perceived credibility of sources in the context of the #MeToo Movement. The baseline 
category of the treatment variable is the condition that is not displayed in the model, so the 
coefficient in this model is the average difference for the victim condition compared to the actress 
condition baseline. I include education, sex, and race as control variables in the model, and I 
include a measure of party identity strength to compare the effects of expert source cues between 
partisans with strong and weak identities. To compare the effects of party identity in each 










Table 22: How Individual Characteristics Influence Source Credibility in the context of the 
#MeToo Movement 
 Perceived Credibility in the context 







































See full model with Race in Appendix A 
Standard errors in parentheses 
**indicates significance at p < 0.05 *indicates significance at p < 0.10 
For Table 22, Male is baseline category for Sex. The actress condition is the baseline category for the experimental 
treatment. Party identity is scaled from 1-7, with 1 representing a value of “Strong Republican” and 7 representing 
“Strong Democrat.” Education is scaled from 2-6, with 1 representing “High School Graduate” and 6 representing 
“Postgraduate education.” 
 
 Even accounting for party identity and individual factors, the effects of the experimental 
treatment persist. The significant coefficient next to the victim version indicates that the presence 
of this treatment produces a negative effect on the dependent variable, which corresponds to higher 
perceived credibility. Thus, respondents are still more likely to perceive victims of sexual 
harassment as more credible sources of information than actresses when discussing the need to 
increase awareness and attention to sexual harassment. These results support the Issue Authority 
Hypothesis, though some interesting additional trends emerge from this analysis. Regardless of 
which version female respondents received, they perceive both victims of sexual harassment and 
Hollywood actress advocating for greater attention to sexual harassment as credible sources of 
information on this issue, as indicated by the significant coefficient next to the “female” variable. 
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Perhaps because the #MeToo Movement primarily concerns sexual harassment claims from 
women, female participants accord a great deal of credibility to other women—members of their 
own group (Johnson and Hawbaker, 2018). However, further analysis is necessary to explore the 
effects of gender and gender identity strength, as this survey only included measures related to sex.  
 While party identity did not moderate perceptions of issue authority in the context of the 
#MeToo Movement, Republican identity influences the effects of issue authority in this issue 
domain. Regardless of the experimental condition respondents received, as Republican identity 
strength increases, participants were less likely to perceive groups advocating for increased 
attention to sexual harassment as credible sources of information. Thus, victims of sexual 
harassment do not deliver expert source cues that are persuasive for all recipients. The Party 
Identity Threshold Hypothesis did not extend to this issue area, as the #MeToo Movement 
functions is the newest issue examined here. However, recent public opinion polls suggest that 
partisan divisions are developing in this context (Conroy, 2019).   
 Moreover, party identity still moderates the effects of social group issue authority when 
interacting this identity with the experimental condition. However, observing the effects of how 
party identity shapes perceptions of credibility for each of the experimental conditions reveals that 
the inclusion of the issue authority cue actually changes perceptions of credibility among strong 
Republicans more than strong Democrats. Figure 4 displays the marginal effects plot for the 






Figure 4: Perceived Source Credibility by Party Identity Strength for the #MeToo Movement  
 
In this experiment, 0 indicates responses to the actress cue, while 1 indicates responses to the victim cue.  
 
The interaction of party identity strength and experimental condition demonstrates the 
persuasive power of issue authority source cues in a surprising fashion. That is, issue authority 
source cues effect how strong Republicans perceive source credibility more than strong 
Democrats. Specifically, strong Republicans find victims of sexual harassment to be more credible 
sources of information about this issue than actresses.  This is important because it suggests that 
groups with issue authority might persuade strong Republicans to pay greater attention to 
discussions of an issue, like sexual harassment, than they may otherwise be inclined to do. To be 
clear, strong Republicans still deem victims of sexual harassment as less credible sources than 
strong Democrats, but this difference is minimized by the presence of an expert source cue. In 
contrast, strong Democrats are more likely to regard both victims of sexual harassment and 
Hollywood actresses as credible sources of information on sexual harassment though; they are 
simply more receptive to the message regardless of who is delivering it. Still, these results for 















Issue Authority Cues in the Context of Immigration  
Issue authority produces expert source cues in the context of the #MeToo Movement; does 
this trend also hold true in the context of immigration, an older issue that has inspired intense 
partisan divisions in recent elections?  To explore the effects of issue authority in this context, I 
first compare respondents’ reactions to the vignettes featuring Latino and Muslim immigrants 
speaking in favor of the implementation of an English language program for new immigrants. The 
results from this examination reveal that respondents do, indeed, vary in their perceptions of 
credibility when learning information about this policy from disparate sources. 
 Table 23 displays the results from a t-test that compares responses to the survey question 
about the credibility of both sources in the context of immigration. Again, response options to the 
survey question involving source credibility ranged from 1-4, where 1 represents the most credible, 
and 4 represents the least credible. Participants who received the version of the story where a group 
of Muslim immigrants delivered the information had a higher mean value, which translates into a 
lower level of perceived credibility than respondents who were assigned the version where Latinos 
delivered the message. The difference of means is statistically significant, which demonstrates that 
people again perceive issue authorities as more credible sources of information in this issue area. 








Table 23: Comparing Source Cues for Immigration 












**indicates significance at p < 0.05 
 
 The results from the t-test suggest that issue authority produces expert source cues in the 
context of immigration, as Latinos enjoy more credibility than Muslims when proposing an 
English language immersion policy. However, further analysis is needed to determine whether this 
effect remains significant in the presence of individual-level characteristics and party identity 
strength. Table 4 displays the results from an OLS regression analysis where the dependent 
variable is perceived credibility of sources in the context of immigration. The baseline category of 
the treatment variable is the condition that is not displayed in the model, so the coefficient in this 
model is the average difference for the Latino condition compared to the Muslim condition 
baseline. Again, I include education, sex, and race as control variables in the model, and I include 
a measure of party identity strength to compare the effects of expert source cues between partisans 
with strong and weak identities. To compare the effects of party identity in each condition, I 







Table 24: How Individual Characteristics Influence Source Credibility in the context of 
Immigration 
 
See full model with Race in Appendix A 
Standard errors in parentheses 
**indicates significance at p < 0.05 *indicates significance at p < 0.10 
The Muslim condition is the baseline category for the experimental treatment. 
See Table 22 for information about the coding of other variables 
When accounting for party identity strength and individual demographics, the effects of 
the experimental condition disappear. The difference in perceived source credibility between 
respondents who received the Latino and the Muslim source cues is no longer significant. Sex 
moderates perceived credibility in this issue area similar to its effects on perceived credibility in 
the context of the #MeToo Movement. Female respondents are more likely to perceive the source 
as credible than their male counterparts as evidenced by the negative coefficient next to the Female 
variable, which corresponds to higher perceived credibility. Though once again, this model only 
includes a measure of sex, so further research is necessary to explore the effects of gender and 
gender identity on the effects of social group issue authority. These results point to the conditional 
effects of expert source cues in this issue area. 










































 Additionally, the negative coefficient next to the party identity variable indicates that 
respondents with a strong Democratic identity are more likely than respondents with a strong 
Republican identity to perceive the source of this information as credible, regardless of which 
group delivers the message about English language programs. The interaction of party identity 
strength and the experimental condition also supports this trend, which signifies that the effects of 
social group issue authority differ in this issue domain compared to the #MeToo Movement. Even 
when respondents with a strong Republican identity received the version of the survey where 
Latino immigrants proposed the English language programs, they still deemed the source less 
credible than their counterparts with stronger Democratic identities. 
These results suggest that expertise does, in fact, have limits. While the simple comparison 
between experimental conditions points to the greater credibility of Latinos, the group with more 
issue authority, the regression model that controls for individual-level factors and party identity 
strength demonstrates that this expert source cue is not as persuasive to strong Republicans. This 
trend supports the Partisan Threshold Hypothesis. Members of the public with strong Republican 
identities were less likely to deem Latinos as the most qualified group to speak about immigration 
in the first place, so this cue is not as persuasive to these individuals. In this issue context, issue 
authority translates into sources cues with perceived credibility more effectively for participants 
with a stronger Democratic identity.  
Though immigration was not a polarizing partisan issue for the entirety of its lifespan on 
the American political agenda, it has become an especially divisive partisan issue during the Trump 
Administration. While Democrats support less restrictive immigration policies, Republicans have 
become increasingly favorable toward stricter immigration laws (Thompson, 2018). Not only 
might respondents with stronger Republican identities question the authority of Latino and Muslim 
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immigrants on this issue, but they may also reject their appeals because they reject this policy 
despite its endorsement of assimilation. They may not want to aid new immigrants in any capacity, 
despite their citizen status or intention to immerse themselves into American culture. In effect, it 
may be hard to find any outgroup source—regardless of their expertise—that Republicans would 
find credible to deliver this message given their apparent hostility to it. 
Issue Authority Cues in the Context of Gun Control  
 The results from the previous two issue domains point to the importance of context. The 
public regards victims of sexual harassment as the most qualified group to discuss the #MeToo 
Movement, and they perceive them as more credible sources of information on sexual harassment 
compared to other groups. However, party identity strength prevents Latinos from serving as 
credible sources of information on immigration despite possessing authority on this issue. I 
conclude my initial exploration of the effects of social group issue authority by evaluating whether 
victims of gun violence, who have issue authority, also serve as credible sources of information 
on gun control.  
 Table 25 displays the results from the t-test that compares how credible respondents deem 
sources of information about gun control. Response options for perceived credibility range from 
1-4, where 1 represents the most credible, and 4 represents the least credible. Participants who 
received the version of the story where poor people delivered the information had a higher mean 
value, which translates into lower perceived credibility, on this measure than respondents who 
were assigned the version where victims of gun violence spoke about the need for concealed carry 
permits. The difference of means is statistically significant, which demonstrates that issue 
authority does supply an expert cue in this issue area. Once again, then, the preliminary results 
support the Issue Authority Hypothesis. 
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Table 25: Comparing Source Cues for the Gun Control 












**indicates significance at p < 0.05 
 
 In this final issue area, authorities again speak with more credibility than their counterparts 
deemed less qualified by much of the public. However, results from the previous two issue areas 
underscore the need to explore beyond a simple difference of means. Table 6 displays the results 
from an OLS regression analysis where the dependent variable is perceived credibility of sources 
in the context of gun control. The baseline category of the treatment variable is the condition that 
is not displayed in the model, so the coefficient in this model is the average difference for the 
victim of gun violence condition compared to the poor condition baseline. I once again include 
education, sex, and race as control variables in the model, and a measure of party identity strength 
to compare the effects of expert source cues between partisans with strong and weak identities. To 
compare the effects of party identity in each condition, I interact party identity strength and the 









Table 26: How Individual Characteristics Influence Source Credibility in the context of the Gun 
Control 
 Perceived Credibility in the context of 







































See full model with Race in Appendix A 
Standard errors in parentheses 
**indicates significance at p < 0.05 *indicates significance at p < 0.10 
The poor condition is the baseline category for the experimental treatment. 
See Table 22 for information about the coding of other variables. 
 Although individual level factors contribute to perceptions of source credibility in the 
context of gun control, issue authority still produces an expert cue in this context. Controlling for 
demographic factors and party identity, the negative coefficient next to the Victim Version variable 
indicates that respondents still deem victims of gun violence as more credible sources of 
information than poor people. However, regardless of the experimental condition, the negative 
coefficient next to the Female variable demonstrates that females still regard the source of 
information as more credible than their male counterparts. The trends across issue areas point to 
differences between the sexes and suggests the need for future research examining how gender 
and gender identity moderate the effects of social group issue authority. 
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 Figure 2 displays the marginal effects plot for the interaction between party identity 
strength and the experimental condition.  Strong Democrats perceive the sources of information as 
more credible than their Republican counterparts regardless of which experimental treatment they 
received. However, the interaction between experimental condition and party identity strength is 
significant: party identity influences perceptions of credibility differently depending on the 
condition respondents received. Observing the independent effects of party in shaping perceived 
source credibility supports the Partisan Threshold Hypothesis.  
Figure 5: Perceived Source Credibility by Party Identity Strength for Gun Control 
 
In this experiment, 0 indicates responses to the poor cue, while 1 indicates responses to the victim cue.  
 
 Unlike in the case of the #MeToo Movement, strong Republicans perceive issue authorities 
as less credible sources of information in the context of gun control. Specifically, strong 
Republicans perceived victims of gun violence as less credible than the poor in conveying 
information in favor of concealed carry permits. The results from this model offer support for the 
Partisan Threshold Hypothesis, as the significant effects of party identity on perceptions of 
credibility provide a threshold of expertise. Strong Republicans are less likely than their strong 















this expert cue does not provide persuasive messages that supersede the effects of party identity. 
Additionally, strong Republicans may have doubted the treatment. They may not have believed 
sincerely that victims of gun violence would advocate in favor of concealed carry permits. 
DISCUSSION  
 Issue authority is contextual, and the results from this study indicate that the effects of issue 
authority also vary across contexts. When compared to groups the public deems less qualified to 
speak about the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control, issue authorities are perceived 
as more credible sources of information on these issues. Respondents perceived victims of sexual 
harassment as more credible sources of information on sexual harassment attention than a group 
of Hollywood actresses. In the context of immigration, Latinos were deemed as more credible 
sources of information on English-language immersion programs than their Muslim counterparts. 
Finally, victims of gun violence served as more credible sources of information than poor people 
when discussing the need to allow concealed carry in more places. The simple comparisons of 
issue authorities to other groups offers support for the Issue Authority Hypothesis.  
 However, the multivariate analyses point to the importance of individual-level factors in 
shaping perceived credibility along with the experimental condition. The expert cues provided by 
issue authorities fade in importance in the context of immigration when controlling for party 
identity. Additionally, while victims of gun violence still deliver expert source cues in the context 
of gun control, these cues are not as persuasive to strong Republicans who perceive victims of gun 
violence and poor people as less credible than respondents with strong Democratic identities. 
Further, strong Republicans who received the issue authority cue were even less likely to perceive 
this group as credible than strong Republicans who received the version of the survey where poor 
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people advocated for concealed carry policy proposal. These results offer support for the Partisan 
Threshold Hypothesis.  
 Not only do these findings suggest that issue authority produces expert source cues in 
certain contexts, they also advance our understanding of source credibility. Previous research has 
assumed expertise always supplies the public with more persuasive cues than an identity-based 
cue grounded in ingroup bias (Wiener and Mowen; 1986, Tajfel and Turner; 1986). My research 
suggests that there are limits to expertise. Strong group identities still function as the most 
accessible lens through which many people perceive new information in the context of 
immigration. Specifically, strong Republicans did not defer to Latinos, despite their issue 
authority, which suggests that expert source cues do not override the effects of identity-based cues 
in this context. Additionally, party identity shape perceptions of credibility in the context of gun 
control, again demonstrating that partisan framing reduces the effects of expert source cues. 
 Furthermore, my findings also contribute to our comprehension of the qualities that 
translate into expertise. Victimhood does, indeed, constitute a kind of expertise. Both victims of 
sexual harassment and victims of gun violence were perceived as more credible sources of 
information on the #MeToo Movement and gun control, respectively. Even when accounting for 
party identity, these victims still delivered powerful messages about their proposed policies. 
Perhaps their traumatic firsthand experience with these issues implies that they deserve to speak 
about them and have earned their credibility in the minds of the public. 
 The Partisan Threshold Hypothesis did not include the #MeToo Movement, as my 
expectations for this issue domain differed from the other two given both its recent appearance and 
my own research. I expected party identity to shape perceived credibility of issue authorities in the 
contexts of immigration and gun control because partisans differed in their perception of these 
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authorities in the first place. However, the results from this study are consistent with recent public 
opinion polling on the #MeToo Movement and sexual harassment. As the issue persists over the 
long term, partisans are beginning to form different reactions to this movement. Although 
Republicans did perceive victims of sexual harassment as more credible than a group of 
Hollywood actresses, overall strong Republicans were less likely than strong Democrats to deem 
both sources as credible.  
 Several limitations of this study exist and should be examined in future research. First, the 
small sample and its lack of representativeness prevent me from generalizing the results of this 
analysis to the population as a whole. In the previous chapters, I explore the role of education in 
shaping issue authority, and I control for education level when assessing its effects in this chapter. 
However, the lack of variation may prevent this individual level factor from altering perceptions 
of source credibility. Respondents with higher education levels were more likely to rank victims 
of sexual harassment and victims of gun violence as the most qualified groups to discuss the 
#MeToo Movement and gun control, respectively. However, in this analysis education did not 
produce disparities in perceived credibility of these sources among respondents.  
 Additionally, the small sample size prevented me from including more versions of the 
experimental treatment, as I was not able to include a version without an explicit mention of a 
social group. In future research, I plan to compare issue authority cues to a control condition that 
does not contain any group cues. This analysis will reveal whether or not issue authorities convey 
more expertise overall, or if they only transmit expert cues compared to groups who lack issue 
authority. However, this first step in understanding the effects of issue authority still suggests that 
issue authorities do elicit different responses from respondents than other groups, which does offer 
initial support for the Issue Authority Hypothesis.  
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 Finally, I have explored the construct of issue authority in three issue domains throughout 
this dissertation. However, these issues in no way represent the most prominent ones on the 
American political agenda. Thus, in the future, I plan to expand the focus outside of these contexts 
to understand if issue authority and its effects persist across a broader spectrum of issues. However, 
this dissertation does offer meaningful contributions on the relationship between social groups and 
political issues, as these three issues do vary in important ways (e.g. the length of time they have 
occupied a space on the agenda, the opinions they inspire in the mass public, etc.). They are similar 
in ways that benefit this study as well because opinions on these issues do not fall perfectly across 
partisan lines, as various components of these issues do enjoy broad support or opposition in the 
minds of the public. I also plan to evaluate how additional group identities moderate the effects of 
issue authority. These initial results point to the importance of sex in shaping perceived credibility, 






















CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 How does the public form associations between social groups and political issues, and 
when do these connections help the groups speak credibly on these issues? Findings from the 
proceeding chapters contribute to our understanding of these relationships and their effects on 
the mass public’s perception of the political environment. When the public perceives a group as 
the most qualified to discuss a particular political issue, the group develops issue authority, 
which can translate into expert source cues that increase credibility. 
 Individuals first link social groups to political issues prior to evaluating how qualified the 
groups are to speak about these topics. Other scholars have analyzed the relationships between 
social groups and political issues, but implicit in these studies is a general awareness that a 
connection exists between groups and issues. The first dimension of social group issue authority, 
the Associative Dimension, examines this assumption. Specifically, Chapter 2 explores this 
dimension and offers information on how the public links commonly stereotyped social groups to 
two salient political issues, immigration and gun control.  
The findings in Chapter 2 suggest that qualities related to the issue as well as individual 
factors shape associations. Both social groups and political issues possess general reputations 
apart from specific issue areas. Thus, the public is more easily able to connect positively 
valenced issues with positively stereotyped groups. The number of mass shootings continues to 
increase, and the media frames these events as tragedies worth addressing due to their impact on 
children, churchgoers, and innocent victims. Society regards men as generally competent and 
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somewhat warm, so a majority of respondents in both original surveys linked men to gun control. 
Conversely, people are more likely to associate negatively valenced issues with negatively 
stereotyped groups. Coverage of immigration, especially in the context of the Trump 
Administration, often focuses on its harmful effects on the country. Hence, a majority of 
respondents connected the poor, a group that is perceived generally to be cold and incompetent, 
to immigration. However, individual factors like social group membership and salient group 
identities alter perceptions of associations.  
 After connecting groups and issues, people evaluate whether groups are able to serve as 
effective political actors on these concerns. Though political psychologists have examined the 
general competence of social groups (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 
2008; Cuddy et al., 1999, they have not evaluated the capability of groups in specific issue areas. 
The second dimension of social group issue authority unpacks the concept of competence by 
separating overall stereotypical competence from experiential competence, which occurs in 
specific issue domains. Chapter 3 explains this dimension and how competence translates 
directly into issue authority. 
 The findings in Chapter 3 highlight the integral role context plays in shaping perceptions 
of how qualified certain social groups are to speak about three issues, the #MeToo Movement, 
immigration, and gun control. While a majority of the public ranks victims of gun violence, 
Latinos, and victims of sexual harassment as the most qualified groups to discuss these 
respective issue areas, perceptions of issue authority vary in important ways. Salient group and 
once again moderate how qualified we regard these groups. Additionally, party identity, a 
chronically salient identity in a political context, influences issue authority. Levels of education 
also emerge as an important predictor of social group issue authority, as respondents with higher 
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education levels perceive groups with higher levels of experiential competence as more qualified 
than groups with higher levels of stereotypical competence to speak about these issues. These 
results identify factors that affect perceptions of issue authority as well as suggest the superiority 
of group experiences over general stereotypes in specific contexts. 
  Finally, people determine whether or not social groups with issue authority serve as 
credible sources of information.  Although scholars have examined the dynamics of group cues 
in political settings (Chaiken, 1980; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Weiner and Mowen, 1986; 
Conover, 1988), they have not evaluated whether expert source cues always supply the public 
with persuasive messages. Chapter 4 addresses the implications of issue authority on source 
credibility. 
The final portion of this dissertation analyzes the effects of issue authority, specifically if 
this construct produces expert source cues. While the public does deem the aforementioned three 
groups with issue authority on the #MeToo Movement, immigration, and gun control as more 
credible sources of information than groups with less issue authority, their expertise does not 
allow them to serve as expert sources across contexts. Variation in perceived authority 
contributed to variation in perceptions of source credibility. Party identity still serves as the most  
accessible lens through which people evaluate political messages. In the context of immigration, 
the expertise accorded to groups with issue authority disappeared when taking party identity into 
consideration. Strong Republican respondents did not perceive Latinos as more credible sources 
of information on an immigration policy proposal than another group with less issue authority.  
 When people read headlines and political stories centered around “women’s issues,” 
“black issues,” “LGBTQ issues,” “Christian issues,” etc., do they perceive these groups as the 
most qualified to speak about them? This dissertation first offers an initial answer to why 
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individuals form connections between social groups and political issues. General group 
stereotypes and issue characteristics facilitate the development of links between groups and 
issues. Further, this dissertation explains that individuals associate groups with issues and then 
evaluate how competent groups are to act in these areas. Though blacks may not enjoy positive 
general stereotypes in society, they may indeed be the most qualified to discuss the “black 
issues” present in political discourse. Their unique experiences shape their capability to deliver 
powerful messages about these concerns.  
 Issue authority, like group identity and source credibility, is contextual. Though some 
social groups may be able to use their issue authority to overcome their negative reputations and 
deliver persuasive source cues, others may not be able to appeal across social groups and to 
strong partisans. Further research is necessary to explore how other identities shape issue 
authority in order to understand its implications. Though the #MeToo Movement, immigration, 
and gun control function as important political issues in the current environment, future analysis 
of other issue domains may reveal additional patterns between individual characteristics and the 
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Table 27: Sample Characteristics 




















Less than $20,000 
$70,001 to $100,000 






Party Identity Strength 
Strong Republican 
Independent but lean toward Democrat 
Strong Democrat  
 
Gender Identity Strength 




Racial Identity Strength 
Not at all important 
Somewhat important 



















































Table 28: Immigration Other Categories 




Question Wording Confusion 
Migrant Farm Workers 
Europeans 
English as a Second Language 
People Fleeing Violence 













Table 29: Gun Control Other Categories 
Other Category Frequency 
NRA 
Democrats and Republicans 
The Mentally Ill 
None 
Conservatives 
The Upper Class 
The Gun Lobby 
Republicans 



































Table 30: Immigration Study 1 Number of Groups Mentioned 

















































































Table 31: Immigration Study 2 Number of Groups Mentioned 

















































































Table 32: Gun Control Study 1 Number of Groups Mentioned 


















































































Table 33: Gun Control Study 2 Number of Groups Mentioned 




























































































































APPENDIX 2B: Chapter 2B 
 
 
1. What is your age?  
  Less than 18 (1) ... 110  
2. Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income? 
Less than $20,000  
$20,001 to $35,000   
$35,001 to $50,000   
$50,001 to $70,000   
$70,001 to $100,000   
$100,001 to $150,000   
$150,001 to $200,000   
More than $200,000  
Unsure/Prefer not to say  
 




Whites   
Blacks  
The rich   
The poor   
The middle class   
The elderly   
The disabled    
The homeless   
      
Please list which of the following groups immediately come to mind when you hear the 
following political issues mentioned: 
3. Immigration 
4. Gun control  
 
5. Which term best describes your political party affiliation? 
Strong Republican   
Weak Republican   
Independent but lean toward Republican   
Independent   
Independent but lean toward Democrat   
Weak Democrat   
Strong Democrat   
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6. What is your sex?  
Male  
Female   
Intersex  
Other     
 
7. What term best describes your race? 
Asian/Pacific-Islander   
Black/African-American   
Hispanic/Latino   
Native-American   
White/Caucasian   
Other   
 
8. How important is being [Asian/Asian Pacific Islander, Black/African-American, 
Hispanic/Latino, Native-American, White/Caucasian, or your racer] to your identity? 
Not at all important   
Not too important  
Somewhat important   
Very important   
Extremely important  
 
9. Do you think what happens generally to [Asian/Asian Pacific Islander, Black/African-
American, Hispanic/Latino, Native-American, White/Caucasian, or people of your racial 
10. background] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your 
life? 
Not at all   
Not very much   
Some 
A lot   
 
11. How important is being a [woman or man] to your identity? 
Not at all important  
Not too important   
Somewhat important   
Very important  
Extremely important   
 
12. Do you think what happens generally to [women or men] in this country will have 
something to do with what happens in your life? 
Not at all   
Not very much   
Some   




Study 2: Survey Questions Used 
1. What is your age? 
 
2. Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income? 
Less than $20,000 
$20,001 to $35,000   
$35,001 to $50,000   
$50,001 to $70,000   
$70,001 to $100,000   
$100,001 to $150,000   
$150,001 to $200,000  
More than $200,000   
Unsure/Prefer not to say   
 
3. Check which of the following groups (if any) immediately come to mind when you hear 
the following political issue mentioned? 
Immigration 
Women   
Men   
Whites   
Blacks   
The rich   
The poor   
The middle class   
The elderly   
The disabled   
The homeless  
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Gun control  
Women   
Men   
Whites   
Blacks   
The rich   
The poor   
The middle class   
The elderly   
The disabled  
The homeless    
 
4. Which term best describes your political party affiliation? 
Strong Republican   
Weak Republican   
Independent but lean toward Republican   
Independent   
Independent but lean toward Democrat   
Weak Democrat   
Strong Democrat    
 
5. What is your sex?  
Male  
Female   
Other   
 
6. What term best describes your race? 
Asian/Pacific-Islander   
Black/African-American   
Hispanic/Latino  
Native-American   
White/Caucasian   
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Table 34: Sample Information 



















Did not graduate from high school 
2-year college degree 












Gender Identity Strength 
(Chronbach’s alpha=.61) 
 




Racial Identity Strength 
(Chronbach’s alpha=.59) 
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Survey Questions Used 
1. Please select your age.  
Under 18  
18 - 24  
25 - 34   
35 - 44    
45 - 54  
55 - 64  
65+  
 
2. What is your sex?  
Male   
Female  
Intersex   
Other   
 
3. Which term best describes your political party affiliation? 
Democrat   
Republican   
Independent   
  
4. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
Did not graduate from high school   
High school graduate   
Some college, but no degree (yet)   
2-year college degree  
4-year college degree  
Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, Ph.D., etc.)   
 
5. Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income? 
Less than $20,000   
$20,001 to $35,000   
$35,001 to $50,000   
$50,001 to $70,000  
$70,001 to $100,000   
$100,001 to $150,000   
$150,001 to $200,000   
More than $200,000  





6. For the following political issue, rank the groups (if any) that are the most qualified to 
talk about the issue, with 1 being the most qualified and 11 being the least qualified. You 
may drag the groups around to rank them according to your preference. 
 
Immigration 
______ Asians  
______ Undocumented immigrants  
______ Whites 
______ Muslims  
______ The rich  
______ The poor  
______ Latinos  
______ Dreamers  
______ Children  
______ Blue collar workers  
______ Some other group  
 
 
7. For the following political issue, rank the groups (if any) that are the most qualified to 
talk about the issue, with 1 being the most qualified and 11 being the least qualified. 
You may drag the groups around to rank them according to your preference. 
 
The #MeToo Movement 
______ Single women  
______ Men 
______ Working women  
______ The poor  
______ The disabled  
______ Whites  
______ Celebrities 
______ LGBTQ  
______ Blacks  
______ Millennials  
______ Victims of sexual harassment  










8. For the following political issue, rank the groups (if any) that are the most qualified to 
talk about the issue, with 1 being the most qualified and 11 being the least qualified. You 
may drag the groups around to rank them according to your preference. 
Gun control 
______ Mothers  
______ Men  
______ Whites  
______ Blacks  
______ Gun owners  
______ The poor  
______ The disabled  
______ Students  
______ Rural residents  
______ Veterans  
______ Victims of gun violence  
______ Some other group  
 
9. Which term best describes the strength of your political party affiliation? 
Strong Republican   
Weak Republican   
Independent but lean toward Republican 
Independent 
Independent but lean toward Democrat  
Weak Democrat  
Strong Democrat  
 








11. How important is being [Asian/Asian Pacific Islander, Black/African-American, 
Hispanic/Latino, Native-American, White/Caucasian, or your racer] to your identity? 
Not at all important   
Not too important  
Somewhat important   
Very important   







12. Do you think what happens generally to [Asian/Asian Pacific Islander, Black/African-
American, Hispanic/Latino, Native-American, White/Caucasian, or people of your racial 
background] people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your 
life? 
Not at all  
Not very much  
Some   
      A lot 
 
13. How important is being a [woman or man] to your identity? 
Not at all important  
Not too important  
Somewhat important  
Very important  
Extremely important   
 
14. Do you think what happens generally to [women or men] in this country will have 
something to do with what happens in your life? 
Not at all  
Not very much  
Some  



























Table 35: Full Rankings for the #MeToo Movement 
GROUP 1ST Quarter  2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter 





















































































































Table 36: Full Rankings for Immigration  
 
















































































































Table 37: Full Rankings for Gun Control  
 
GROUP 1ST Quarter  2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter 





















































































































Table 38: OLS Regression Models for the #MeToo Movement 
 
 Victims of Sexual 
Harassment 









































































































Standard errors in parentheses 
For Race, baseline category is White 

























Table 39: OLS Regression Models for Gun Control 
 









































































































For Race, baseline category is White 
Standard errors in parentheses 



























Table 40: OLS Regression Models for Immigration 
 



























































































































































For Race, baseline category is White 
Standard errors in parentheses  

















































Table 41: #MeToo Movement Average Perceived Authority 
 





































































Table 42: Immigration Average Perceived Authority 
 



































































Table 43: Gun Control Movement Average Perceived Authority 
 








































































First Pretest: Fall 2017 Qualtrics survey 
Students, faculty, staff at a large public research university in the South were recruited via a 
university-wide mass email. The survey was live for a week. Participants who completed the 
survey were redirected to a separate survey where they could fill in their information to be 
entered to win one of ten $20 Amazon gift cards. In this survey, respondents answered close-
ended questions that asked, “For each of the following political issues, check all of the groups (if 
any) that are qualified to talk about the issue.” 703 respondents answered these questions for gun 
control and immigration. This preliminary analysis motivated me to include groups that 
respondents selected for these questions (e.g. the poor, Whites) and disregard groups they did not 
select (e.g. the elderly, the middle class). See table below for information on the sample.  




















Less than $20,000 
$70,001 to $100,000 






Party Identity Strength 
Strong Republican 
Independent but lean toward Democrat 






































Second Pretest: Spring 2018 
Graduate students from a large public research university in the South participated in this pretest 
where I revised the question to correspond to the current version of the survey. Instead of 
allowing participants to check any all groups that were qualified to speak about the issues, this 
survey included questions that asked respondents, “For the following political issue, rank the 
groups (if any) that are the most qualified to talk about the issue, with 1 being the most qualified 
and 11 being the least qualified. You may drag the groups around to rank them according to your 
preference.” This survey included the #MeToo Movement along with immigration and gun 
control options. This survey allowed me to test the current version of the question measuring 
issue authority prior to sending the main survey out to the representative sample. Additionally, it 
provided information about groups respondents perceived as qualified to speak about the 
#MeToo Movement. Based on the results from this pretest, I included “victims of sexual 
harassment” as an issue-specific group for the #MeToo Movement in addition to groups that 
represent the various combinations of stereotypes (HW-HC, LW-LC, etc.).  
 
Table 45: Second Pretest Sample Summary 















$20,001 to $35,000 
$70,001 to $100,00 
More than $200,000  
 
Party Identity Strength 




































Table 46: Sample Characteristics 
Each Ordinal Variable includes the minimum, mean, and maximum value.  
Age 
















High school graduate 
Some college, but no degree (yet) 
Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD) 
 
















































Table 47: #MeToo Movement T-Test 



























Table 48: Immigration T-Test 
































Table 49: Gun Control T-Test 














































Table 50: Full OLS Model for the #MeToo Movement 
 Perceived Credibility in the context 

















































For Race, baseline category is White 
Standard errors in parentheses 


























Table 51: Full OLS Model for Immigration 


















































For Race, baseline category is White 
Standard errors in parentheses 


























Table 52: Full OLS Model for Gun Control 
 Perceived Credibility in the context of 

















































For Race, baseline category is White 
Standard errors in parentheses 

























Survey Questions Used 
1. What is your age?  
       -Under 18 
       -18-24 
       -25-34 
       -35-44 
       -45-54 
       -55-64 
       -65-74 
       -75-84 
       -85 or older 
 
2. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
-Did not graduate from high school  
-High school graduate   
-Some college, but no degree (yet)   
-2-year college degree   
-4-year college degree  
-Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, Ph.D., etc.)   
 
3. Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income? 
-Less than $20,000   
-$20,001 to $35,000   
-$35,001 to $50,000   
-$50,001 to $70,000   
-$70,001 to $100,000   
-$100,001 to $150,000   
-$150,001 to $200,000  
-More than $200,000   
-Unsure/Prefer not to say   
 
4. At a Congressional hearing last week, a group of Hollywood actresses testified that they are 
outraged by how widespread sexual harassment is in American society. They want Congress to 
make this issue a priority on its agenda, as the #MeToo Movement has made clear the need for 
bipartisan action on sexual harassment. 
Do you agree or disagree that Congressional hearings on sexual harassment are likely to produce 
useful information? 
-Strongly Agree   
-Agree   
-Somewhat agree   
-Neither agree nor disagree   
-Somewhat disagree   
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-Disagree   
-Strongly disagree  
 
5. How credible do you find actresses when they advocate for bipartisan action on sexual 
harassment?  
-A great deal   
-Somewhat   
-Not much   
-Not at all   
 
6. At a Congressional hearing last week, victims of sexual harassment testified that they are 
outraged by how widespread sexual harassment is in American society. They want Congress to  
make this issue a priority on its agenda, as the #MeToo Movement has made clear the need for 
bipartisan action on sexual harassment. 
 
Do you agree or disagree that Congressional hearings on sexual harassment are likely to produce 
useful information? 
-Strongly Agree   
-Agree   
-Somewhat agree   
-Neither agree nor disagree   
-Somewhat disagree   
-Disagree   
-Strongly disagree   
 
7. How credible do you find victims of sexual harassment when they advocate for bipartisan 
action on sexual harassment?  
-A great deal   
-Somewhat   
-Not much  
-Not at all   
 
8. A group of Latinos testified at a Senate hearing about immigration last week. They are new 
citizens who talked about successfully completing an English language program. They testified 
that all immigrants should learn English because it helps them more easily join American  
society." 
 
Do you agree or disagree that Senate hearings provide useful information about English language 
programs for immigrants? 
-Strongly agree   
-Agree   
-Somewhat agree   
-Neither agree nor disagree   
-Somewhat disagree   
-Disagree   
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-Strongly disagree   
 
 
9. How credible do you find Latinos when they advocate for English language programs on 
behalf of immigrants? 
-A great deal   
-Somewhat   
-Not much   
-Not at all    
 
10. A group of Muslims testified at a Senate hearing about immigration last week. They are new 
citizens who talked about successfully completing an English language program. They testified  
that all immigrants should learn English because it helps them more easily join American 
society. 
 
11. Do you agree or disagree that Senate hearings provide useful information about English 
language programs for immigrants? 
-Strongly agree   
-Agree   
-Somewhat agree   
-Neither agree nor disagree   
-Somewhat disagree   
-Disagree   
-Strongly disagree   
 
 
12. How credible do you find Muslims when they advocate for English language programs on 
behalf of immigrants? 
-A great deal   
-Somewhat    
-Not much   
-Not at all  
 
13.Victims of gun violence came forward to testify at a public hearing last week. They are 
outraged by the pervasiveness of gun violence in American society. They want Congress to 
allow  
concealed carry in more places to prevent more gun violence. 
 
Do you agree or disagree that hearings provide useful information about concealed carry 
policies? 
-Strongly agree   
-Agree    
-Somewhat agree   
-Neither agree nor disagree    
-Somewhat disagree   
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-Disagree   
-Strongly disagree    
 
14. How credible do you find victims of gun violence when they advocate for bipartisan action 
on concealed carry?  
-A great deal   
-Somewhat   
-Not much   
-Not at all   
 
15. A group of poor people came forward to testify at a public hearing last week. They are 
outraged by the pervasiveness of gun violence in American society. They want Congress to 
allow 
concealed carry in more places to prevent more gun violence. 
 
Do you agree or disagree that public hearings provide useful information about concealed carry 
policies? 
-Strongly agree   
-Agree   
-Somewhat agree   
-Neither agree nor disagree   
-Somewhat disagree   
-Disagree   
-Strongly disagree  
 
16. How credible do you find poor people when they advocate for bipartisan actions on 
concealed carry?  
-A great deal    
-Somewhat    
-Not much    
-Not at all    
 
17. Which term best describes your political party affiliation? 
-Strong Republican  
-Weak Republican  
-Independent but lean toward Republican  
-Independent    
-Independent but lean toward Democrat  
-Weak Democrat    
-Strong Democrat   
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18. What is your sex?  
-Male   
-Female   
-Intersex   
-Other   
-Prefer not to say  
 
19. What term best describes your race? 
-Asian/Pacific-Islander   
-Black/African-American   
-Hispanic/Latino    
-Native-American   
-White/Caucasian   




































Pretest Sample  
Students at a large public research university in the South enrolled in a Public Opinion course 
were recruited via email to participate in the pretest. The survey was live for a week. Participants 
who completed the survey received extra credit class participation points. The survey instrument 
in the pretest is identical to the one used for the large student sample in the body of the paper. 
The results from this pretest revealed whether or not the experimental conditions were producing 
variations in responses.  
 
Table 53: Pretest Sample Characteristics 
















Less than $20,000 
$70,001 to $100,000 
More than $200,000 
 
 
Party Identity Strength 
Strong Republican 
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